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"Civilizing" Nonjury Trials
F. R1. Lacy*
With jury trial on the wane in American civil litigation, Professor
Lacy contends that two systems of procedure might be feasible-one
for jury trials and one for nonjury trials. The author here examines
the sophisticated civil law nonjury procedure of Austria and the
common law nonjury procedure of Israel in light of the underlying
contention that Americans should consider devising distinct rules of
procedure for nonjury cases.
This article is intended to make people think about American
procedure, yet it is devoted largely to a description of Austrian and
Israeli civil procedure and perhaps that calls for some disclaiming and
confessing and avoiding. I have spent only a few months in the two
countries and have no doubt that I am open to the charge, made
against far more seasoned American comparatists,1 that I tend to look
at foreign systems through American conceptual spectacles. By way
of avoidance let me offer, first, the usual defense of the popularizer.
There never will be many serious students of comparative law in the
United States. If foreign ideas are to play any part in thinking about
American law, it is essential to get some general information out to
the grass roots. Secondly, as indicated above, this article is intended
as a consideration, largely by implication it is true, of American proce-
dure and it is aimed at the reader who, whatever the level of his
information and interest in foreign systems, knows a good deal about
American procedure. I believe that such a person's thinking about his
own system is likely to be enriched by even somewhat oversimplified
ideas about a foreign system.
I.
jury trial is on the wane in the United States. A strong case can
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon. This article was prepared by the author
for the Comparative Study of the Administration of Justice, established under the
term of a grant from the Ford Foundation to Loyola University (Chicago) School of
Law, and is published here with the consent of the Study. All rights are reserved by
the Study.
1. NA AmuRA, A ComU¢PA.AvE STUny oF JuDiciAL PnocxssEs'l (Waseda Univ. Inst.
Comp. Law 1 1959). Commenting on Von Mehren's comparative analysis of judicial
process in The Civil Law System, Cases and Materials for the Comparative Study of
Law, Nakamura writes: "Frankly speaking he simply analyzes the French and German
legal systems (or the Japanese legal system, while he was in Japan) from the standpoint
of an Anglo-American jurist ... this cannot be called comparative legal study." Id.
at 13.
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be made for its retention in criminal cases and personal injury cases.
Here the essence of the trial is not so much, or at least not solely, to
find isolated historical facts, but rather to evaluate facts and pass
community judgment on a complex human situation.2 Also, in per-
sonal injury cases, many contend that the jury supplies a devious but
on the whole desirable, corrective to certain draconian rules of sub-
stantive law.3 Outside these fields little can be said in favor of jury
trial. There is no need to elaborate its expense, cumbersomeness,
and unfitness to deal with complex issues. Waiver of jury, frequent
today in commercial and other "inhuman" cases, will probably be-
come more frequent and spread to other kinds of cases.4 And of
course, there is the equity side.
There is nothing new about this and the purpose of this article is
not to argue for or against jury trial, but to suggest the possibility
of reforming the procedure followed in such nonjury trials as may
occur. The rules of procedure relating to the definition and determi-
nation of issues of fact, in particular, the rules of evidence, in force
in American jurisdictions were designed for jury trial.5  They em-
phasize formality and breathe a considerable distrust of the fact
finder. Varying with jurisdiction, judge, and counsel, there may be
more or less common-consensual relaxation of these rules in nonjury
2. Cf. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REv. 150 (1952) (jury's
proper function is to react emotionally and irrationally).
3. 2 HARPER & Jmms, TORTS 889-95, 1128-29 (1956); Weinstein, Routine Bifurca-
tion of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making
Power, 14 VANm. L. REv. 831, 832-35 (1961). For a recent protest against such
left-handed law reform, see Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAnv.
L. RE v. 463, 503-06 (1962).
4. This has been the course of development in England. It has been aided some
by statute, and of course there is no constitutional impediment, but presumably the
change reflects what the people want. See DEvLn, TmAL BY JUty 129-35 (1956).
Recent appraisals of the jury system in the United States appear in JoINEn, CIvm
JusncE ArN THE JURY (1962), reviewed by Herbert Galton, 42 OnE. L. flv. 91
(1962); Green, Juries and Justice-the Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962
U. ILL. "L.F. -152. -See also Foster, Jury Trial on Trial-A Symposium, 28 N7Y.S.B. BULL.
322 (1956).
5. The traditional view that the jury system is the mother of the rules of evidence
is questioned, with specific reference to the hearsay rule, in McGunrE, Evmmcz:
CommoN SENsE AND Com-mom LAw 15 (1947) and Chadbourn, Bentham and the
Hearsay Rule, 75 HARV. L. RBv. 932, 938 (1962). Mannheim, "Trial By Jury" in
Modern Continental Criminal Law, 53 L.Q. REv. 99, 388-94 (1937), explains how
adoption of jury systems on the continent following the French Revolution was
associated with a liberalizing of the law of evidence. However "evidence," to a
civilian, means rules for the evaluation of proof rather than rules of admissibility.
The liberalizing of which Mannheim speaks took the form of rejection of formal rules
of proof which operated positively as well as negatively (an accused had to be con-
victed upon certain kinds of evidence) in favor of requirements of moral proof or
intime conviction because it was believed that such an undirected, essentially subjective,
decision was more safely left to a lay group than to an official.
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cases, but there is no institutionalizing of such relaxation. Thus,
counsel can, and undoubtedly where the interest of his client so
dictates, should limit the evidence that may be considered by an
experienced judge-limit it by excluding matter that would be prop-
erly and reasonably taken into account by a non-professional trial
examiner, or a cautious businessman, in deciding a comparable issue.
In less dramatic ways and probably with less serious effect on the
outcome of the case, he may insist on formality at the expense of
convenience and dispatch in such matters as where and when wit-
nesses will be heard and the proof of not seriously contested allega-
tions. Again nothing new. What is new to me, and perhaps even
new to some readers, is the idea of separate rules of procedure for
jury and nonjury trials. More likely to be new, and, initially at least,
likely to be somewhat unpalatable, is the idea that these nonjury
rules might be influenced by foreign practice. This article is an effort
to present the relative simplicity and straightforwardness of trial in
some other parts of the world and so to raise the question of the
possibility of adopting certain foreign devices without abandoning
the basic principles and virtues of our system of procedure.
It. is natural to begin a search for foreign models in the continental,
civil law countries, as everyone knows they do not use juries.7 As
will shortly appear, I think wholesale borrowing from a civil law
country would be unwise, but a brief description8 of a representative
system is given here with the idea that it will give added insight into
6. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 693
(1964).
7. Actually most of them do, after a fashion, but not in civil cases and the various
codes of civil procedure are free from any influence by the problems created by jury
trial. FoRsTH, TArL By Junry 295-30 (1875), contains a 19th century account of jury
trial in criminal cases in France and Germany. *Mannheim, supra note 5, gives a
very thorough account of the situation on the eve of World War II.
The modem French situation is described in Pugh, Administration of Criminal
Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1962). A panel of
three professional judges and nine laymen, sitting and deliberating together, is used
in the Cour d'Assises for trial of serious offenses. Lesser crimes, punishable by up to
5 years imprisonment, are tried by a judge or panel of judges.
At present in Austria, criminal cases are ordinarily tried by Schoffengerichte made
up of 2 judges and 2 laymen. "Simple" cases may be tried by a single judge.
STMAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 13 (1960). Serious cases in which a penalty of 10 years
imprisonment or more is asked for are tried by a Geschwomengericht made up of
3 judges and 8 jurors. STRAmRozEssoRDNuNG §§ 14, 300. The judges have more con-
trol over the verdict than American judges although they do not deliberate with the
jurors. STRAFPOzEssoDNuNc §§ 332-37. A more complete explanation appears in
BLAscHE, A GEaNRAL ExAmNAoT ION r THE LAWS- OF AusTRYA with REFERENCE TO
UNmTED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDs 11-12, 46-48 (1961).
8. More elaborate recent descriptions of European systems of civil procedure may
be found in: Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71
HAnW. L. REv. 1193, 1443 (1958) (Germany); Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence, 3 Am.
1965]
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certain features of Israeli common law nonjury procedure, a con-
sideration of which is going to be the main concern of this article. I
have chosen Austria's as one of the most recently drafted and ad-
vanced systems and one held in high regard by European proce-
duralists.9
An American trial may be likened to a play produced by counsel
for the judge (or jury). A comparable short characterization of
Austrian civil procedure would depict the judge compiling a file on
the case with the aid of counsel.
Note that the above paragraph contrasts American "trial" and
Austrian "civil procedure." This is because the Austrians do not
separate the pleading and motion stage from the trial proper. As in
America, an action commences with the filing of a written complaint
(Kiage) to which the defendant, after certain formalities, responds
with his Klagebeantwortung. These papers differ from common law
pleadings in several respects. They are not at all binding upon the
parties, but are intended to indicate the general course of judicial
inquiry. Technically, they have no legal effect until acknowledged
at a court session and incorporated by reference into the record (the
J. ComP. L. 313 (1954) (Austria); Murray, A Survey of Civil Procedure in Spain and
Some Comparisons With Civ4l Procedure in the United States, 37 TuL. L. REv. 399
(1963) (Spain).
A good short description of German procedure appears in Kaplan, Civil Procedure-
Reflections on the Comparisons of Systems, 9 BuFFALO L. REv. 409 (1960). Professor
Kaplan is well aware of the danger of indiscriminate borrowing out of context and
interestingly relates an over-all difference between German and American procedure
(i.e., efficient, but not over precise, mass production v. exceedingly fine, and exceed-
ingly slow and expensive, grinding of the particular case) to a basic difference in
substantive concepts, i.e., application of the generalized norms of a code versus common
law case matching. Id. at 421, 426. He makes the point, however, that some proce-
dural reforms currently under consideration in the United States, perhaps unknown to
their supporters, closely parallel the German system: "unmistakably we are moving
along certain lines already familiar to foreign procedures, and I make the simple
suggestion that we could perhaps profit by consulting the analogous foreign models
and experiences directly and explicitly." Id. at 422.
9. The essential outlines of modem Austrian civil procedure were laid down in
the Zivilprozessordnung of 1895 drafted by the great Franz Klein. Naturally there have
been numerous amendments since then as to detail. The basic German procedural
law dates from 1877 and is quite similar to the Austrian. The parallel development
of the two systems in the 18th and 19th Centuries, the advantages of the later-drafted
Austrian law, and its influence on German procedure may be studied in ENGELNANN,
A HIsToRY oF CONTINENTAL CrVIL PRocEDURE 507, 508, 635-37 (Millar 1927). See
also Kaplan, 9 BuFFALo L. REv. at 416-18; Lenhoff, supra note 8, at 316. In France
the present Code of Civil Procedure "is a barely revised edition of the Ordonnance of
1667," DAVID & DE VRIEs, THE FRENcH LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (1958); ENCELMANN, Op.
cit. supra at 748-51.
Modem English procedure is founded on the Hilary Rules promulgated in 1834, the
Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852, 1854, and 1860 and the Law of Judicature Act
of 1873. Probably most American systems can be referred, mediately or immediately,




Protokoll). Even then they are freely amendable at any stage of the
trial. All this reflects the cardinal principles of "orality," material
truth, and judicial control which dictate that the procedure be a
live conference (usually in practice a series of conferences) between
the parties, counsel, and witnesses, supervised by the judge.'0 At
these sessions, the judge must be free to develop the truth unfettered
by technicalities and unlimited by any version of the facts that the
parties, through ineptness or ulterior motives, may have presented
in their pleadings."
An Austrian lawyer who was kind enough to read over a draft of
this article writes respecting the preceding paragraph: "We think
that our civil procedure has expedited the handling of cases a good
deal compared to older procedures. We also think that in the interest
of fast proceeding in average cases our ZPO (Zivilprozessordung)
creates definite obstacles to bringing in new evidence or changing
the legal basis of the complaint as the case is going on. Therefore, I
wouldn't agree that the Klage and Klagebeantwortung are not at all
binding on their authors and that they are freely amendable at any
stage of the case." And further "The judge does decide who will
be called as a witness but he cannot call any person who was not on
one of the parties' lists. Here ends material truth and judicial inquiry
which we don't think we have." The applicable code provisions are
ZPO § 235, which provide that the complaint may be amended at
any time with the consent of the opponent and over the opponent's
10. While these principles and the conference system are the hallmark of modem
Austrian and German procedure, it must not be assumed that they were radical
innovations of the Austrians in 1895, any more than our Federal Rules superseded
by battle overnight in 1938.
"'Orality' was the slogan and battle cry" in 1848 and earlier, Kaplan, von Mehren
and Schaefer, supra note 8, at 1213. Its doctrinaire overemphasis was one of the faults
of the German Code of 1877, avoided by the Austrians and alleviated by subsequent
amendments in Germany. ENEmAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 620-22, 636-37. Material
truth and judicial control reached their zenith in the Prussian General Ordinance of 1793,
and then were greatly de-emphasized in favor of party presentation as part of the wider
19th Century liberal revolt against paternalistic government. Id. at 590-94. As with
"orality," the Austrian code makers concluded that the German reformers also had gone
too far here, and the Austrian code gives the court considerable power to ascertain facts
independently. Id. at 636. See Murray, supra note 8, at 400, 429, 441, regarding the
modem situation in Spain.
"Immediacy"--the principle that the entire trial must be conducted by the
judge or judges who wil make the decision-is instanced by Lenhoff as the most
important new feature of the 1895 code. Lenhoff, supra note 8, at 316-18. One
of the main points of my article is that Austrian trials involve considerably more
writing than American trials. See note 15 infra and accompanying text. When a
continental proceduralist emphasizes the "orality" and "immediacy" of Austrian or
German procedure he is contrasting it with the system formerly followed there, and
still in many European countries, whereby civil litigation is carried on almost entirely
on paper. A Belgian lawyer once told me he had taken part in hundreds of trials
but could not remember ever seeing a witness in court.
11. ENGELmrN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 636.
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objection if the judge considers that this will produce no serious
complication or delay of the proceeding; and ZPO § 183, which pro-
vides that the judge may summon any witness "from whom according
to the complaint or the course of proceedings clarification of material
facts might be expected" unless both parties object thereto. Perhaps
my friend's letter suggests that these powers are rather seldom used
in practice. I suspect that our difference is attributable, in the main,
to the fact that he is comparing his system with the older Austrian
system, or with civil law systems which put greater emphasis on
judicial control, whereas my comparison is with an American system.
Also undoubtedly an observer of a foreign system is prone to over-
simplify and exaggerate differences in an effort to organize his think-
ing about the foreign system vis-a-vis his own. Some of this is excu-
able, perhaps even desirable for orientation purposes, but the reader is
cautioned that modem Austrian procedure has moved considerably
from the polar informal-inquisitorial position suggested in the pre-
ceeding paragraph just as ours has come a long way from the formal-
adversary pole.
Austrian pleadings contain more detailed factual statements and
are more argumentative than those in America. They must indicate
the means by which the pleader proposes to prove each fact alleged,
for example, they typically contain a list of witnesses and docu-
ments.'2 While they should not include propositions of law or cita-
tions to legal authorities, they frequently do. However, there is no
reason to strike such material, since the pleadings are not considered
to be part of the record. As the case proceeds, often in preparation
for, or as a sequel to, a conference, counsel will generally file further
papers called Schriftsiitze. These may be tenders of proof, or amended
pleadings, or stipulations, or memorandums of law, or factual argu-
ment, or, 'frequently, a combination of these.
The heart of the procedure is a series of oral conferences or hear-
ings (miindliche Verhandlungen). The first of these is ordinarily
attended by the parties and their counsel, without witnesses, and is
devoted to a discussion aimed at defining the dispute and, so far as
possible, eliminating issues of fact. When a factual issue is arrived at,
the parties suggest methods of investigation and the judge makes a
decision (Beweisbeschluss) indicating what proofs will be taken. This
is generally followed by a conference devoted primarily to proof taking
and then conferences for further discussion, restatement of positions,
tenders of further proof, et cetera. Usually several weeks elapse be-
tween conferences. This is partly due to docket difficulties, but it is
also desirable to enable counsel to find witnesses, procure experts'
reports, and otherwise to prepare the case. There is no idea of
12. See Appendix A.
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preparing the entire case for presentation at one continuous-session.
This would ,be considered most inefficient as there is always the
chance that certain anterior issues may be resolved in such a way as
to dispose Of the whole case. Thus in negligence cases, the liability.
issue ordinarily will be carried through to final judgment, and even
appealed, before damages are considered.
A major function of the judge at- each conference is the building
of the Protokoll. He does this by dictating audibly13 in open court to
a Schriftfiihrer (usually an apprentice judge or lawyer), the gist of
what each speaker has said-whether testimony, argument by counsel,
tender of proof, or his own rulings. There is no verbatim record.
Although this dictation is in the first person, as though the witness
were speaking, the Protokoll reflects the judge's interpretation of what
was said. Since counsel and witnesses have a chance to correct, any
misunderstandings on the spot, the Protokolt is often more accurate
than a stenographic transcript. It is certainly more meaningful. The
extraneous and immaterial are omitted; if a witness is vague, confused,
or self-contradictory, he is ultimately pinned down and only his final
version recorded.
The mode of examination of a witness also contrasts quite sharply
with American practice. All the witnesses are the court's and not
the parties'. The judge decides who will be called and the order in
which they will be examined and he conducts the examination-in-
chief. Cross-examination is permitted, but is usually quite brief and
restrained. Counsel, and even the parties, may occasionally interrupt
a witness to contradict him or point out the factual or legal implica-
tions of his testimony. This is not strictly proper but is tolerated
within reasonable bounds.14 Also, there are provisions for taking
testimony outside of the courthouse, for example at the home of a
sick or elderly witness, and in other' parts of the country. This will
generally be done by a sort of "deputy judge,"I who is instructed by
the court charged with deciding the case (the erkernendes Gericht)
13. The judge must dictate 'loudly." Yucosr.v LAw ON Crv. P., art. 115 (largely
based on the Austrian law).
14. See Appendix B.
15. If the auxiliary prooftaking is outside the territorial jurisdiction (Sprengel) of
the erkennendes Gericht an ersuchter Richter (requested judge) is used. This will be
a judge, often of an inferior court, having competence in the place where the
examination is to be conducted. Proof taking outside the courtroom but within the
Sprengel of the erkennendes Gericht is usually conducted by the judge in charge of
the case. If a case is heard by a multi-judge Senat such tasks may be assigned to a
single member of the panel-a beauftragter Richter (delegated judge). In theory any
case involving more than 100,000 schillings ($4000) will be-heard by a Senat. but
in practice Senate are rare, the parties usually consenting to trial before a single judge
to avoid delay. A criminal trial usually involves at least one session at the scene
of the crime (Lokalaugenschein) in which the prosecution's version of the crime is
reenacted, often with the defendant in the starring role.
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to examine certain witnesses, inquire into certain matters, and pre-
pare a portion of the Protokoll. In practice, counsel try to bring wit-
nesses of any importance before the erkennendes Gericht, sometimes
after a preliminary appearance before a "deputized judge." There is
very little law of evidence as we think of it-a few privileges and
rules about authentication of documents but nothing remotely ap-
proaching our complex of exclusionary rules. Experts (Sachverstdn-
dige) are much used, not only in respect to medical and scientific
questions, but also on such matters as the cause of traffic accidents
and economic consequences of injuries to person and property. An
expert will usually file a written report (Gutachten) containing a
certain amount of fact-finding as well as his conclusions, but he
often makes no supplementary "live" appearance in court, unless so
requested by one of the parties. Counsel are more likely to propose
the appointment of another expert than try to shake an unfavorable
report by cross-examination.
When the court considers that the case, or a severed issue such
as liability, has been sufficiently ventilated, it declares the oral hear-
ings closed and retires to review the Protokoll which by now may
include pleadings, Schrif-tsdtze, testimony, experts' report, perhaps
the record of a criminal prosecution or police investivation connected
with the main action, and even such items as newspaper clippings
reporting the death of a witness. On the basis of the Protokoll, the
court decides the case and writes a "reasoned" judgment (Urteil)
which sets out its view of the facts and law, explaining why it dis-
believes certain witnesses, and so on. Appendix D is an example of
such a judgment.
The judgment of the court of first instance is added to the Proto-
koll, and an appeal (Berufung), if there is one, involves a more or
less de novo consideration of the whole record. The second instance
court may re-examine witnesses heard below or hear new evidence,
but there is a strong inclination to accept the trial judge's finding of
simple, historical facts though not necessarily his evaluation and
inferences. A third instance procedure (Revision), reviews only
questions of law and there is usually no personal appearance by
counsel.16
If an issue such as liability has been separately decided, the inter-
locutory judgment (Zwischenurteil) may be carried through Beru-
fung and Revision before going on with the rest of the case. There
is also a procedure for interlocutory review of procedural rulings
16. This is fairly typical. Presently in Yugoslavia, counsel are not usually allowed to
appear even in the court of second instance, although a change in this rule is under
consideration. In Germany audience before the Federal Supreme Court is restricted
to members of a very select bar.
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(Beschliisse as opposed to Urteilen). This is called a Rekurs and is
decided without appearance and ex parte. In theory, counsel may
not even know that his- opponent is seeking a Rekurs. Many rulings
are not reviewable17 and more are not specially reviewablela (that is,
they will be considered only if and when there is a review of more
important matter). However, the more important ones usually are
reviewable.19 This also bespeaks a procedural philosophy that favors
settling each issue definitively as it arises.
All this seems rather chaotic to an American observer, on first
acquaintance. He soon observes, however, that the system works
tolerably well. The Austrian legal profession is, of course, thoroughly
familiar with it, and there is no need to unify the presentation
of a case, or keep it simple, for a lay jury. The American observer
may in time conclude that the system has considerable virtues of
flexibility and naturalness. It indeed closely resembles the way most
of us would conduct a serious investigation unhampered by formal
rules. Nor is delay excessive. The trial starts much soorier and, in
all probability, the case is finally disposed of faster- than in:America.
Delays for interlocutory appeals are not much more-than the ordinary
time lapses between first instance hearings.20 While episodic, stop
and go procedure is, of course, impossible with a jibry-, and with a
judge, if an impressionistic reaction to the whole case is desired, it
is by no means unsuitable if the objective is careful collection and
recording of data followed by a decision on the basis of a completed
"file."
In fact, the major objection to borrowing from a civil law system
of procedure is not its disorderliness, but its inquisitorial nature. Of
course, I do not mean black hoods and thumb screws. Modem
western European procedure is as civilized as our own and in fact
many continental lawysrs regard our method of cross-examination as
somewhat barbarous. Rather, the weakness of the .inquisitorial
method is that by charging the judge with active direction of the
case and muting the function of counsel it makes it harder to find the
truth. In order to direct the case efficiently-decide what witnesses
to hear, and in what order, map out the line of questioning to be
17. E.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 82 (fixing time for discovery and inspection of
documents) (hereinafter cited ZPO); ZPO § 349(2) (whether to continue hearing
when witness refuses to testify or to take oath).
18. E.g., ZPO § 130(2) (setting time and place of hearing); ZPO § 173(2) (ex-
cluding public from hearing); ZPO § 277 (Beweisbeschlusse); ZO § 349(1)
(deciding legality of witness's refusal to testify or take oath).
19. E.g., ZPO § 193 (declaring proceedings closed, i.e., finally terminating proof-
taking and argument); ZPO § 194 (reopening for further conferences). Compare
ZPO § 153 which precludes any review of an order relieving party of consequences
of default.
20. See Appendix C.
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pursued-.with each, et cetera-a judge must almost inevitably make
some.tentative hypothesis about the facts. This introduces a consid-
erable psychological danger that the judge will unwittingly persuade
himself by his own questioning 21 Judicial direction of the inquiry
is more pronounced in criminal cases, and the danger just noted
accordingly more serious, but it is a not inconsiderable factor on the
civil side. Further, in view of the concepts that the witnesses are the
court's and not the parties', and that their examination is a search
for truth by the judge with the cooperative assistance of counsel,
there can never be such an effective cross-examination as in a system
that conceives of counsel's first duty as being to doubt and to shake.
And while it is doubtless a hackneyed observation, no one who has
ever seen it done well can have any doubts that cross-examination is
indeed a marvelous engine for the discovery of truth-or at least for
the detection of falsehood.
If the foregoing is the sole objection, and the flexibility and in-
formality of Austrian procedure are desirable, why not adopt it with
such modifications as would permit adversary direction of the case
and effective cross-examination? The answer might be that this would
involve tampering with basic concepts and thus the danger of dis-
locating the whole system. Instead, I suggest consideration of a com-
mon law adversary system which because it has no jury seems to have
developed-or to be on the way to developing-many of the de-
sirable features of the Austrian system. This brings us to Israel.
III.
During the British mandate in Palestine (1923-1948), the Ottoman
procedure, imposed by the former Turkish rulers and based on the
French system, was displaced by rules of civil procedure 2 and a
21. Cf. Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKs oN AMERICAN LAW 30, 41 (Berman
ed. 1961): "[I]t proceeds from a very understandable desire to bring the hearing
into some order and coherence, for without some tentative theory of the case there
is no standard of reference by which testimony may be measured. But what starts as
a preliminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry tends, quickly and imperceptibly,
to become a final conclusion, as all that confirms the diagnosis makes a strong imprint
in the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with divided attention."
-My- Austrian-friend writes-in-this connection: "There is indeed a psychological danger
in the judge directing the case. If the case is complicated and the judge a poor jurist,
he is likely to be inclined to direct fact finding according to his wishes so that he
will be enabled to come to a suitable legal conclusion. But counsel vill bear this in
each question and protest against it or even, as a last resort, ask that the judge be
disqualified. If the judge is a good judge then our system of questioning witnesses at
first by the judge is very efficient and there is not so much chance for counsel to
embarrass and confuse witnesses. If the judge is not as good as he is expected to be
by the ZPO (jura,novit curial) then everything you mention here is true. But what
can you do against poor judges anyway?"
22. Crv. P. ORD., 1938, repealed the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure. The basic
enactment is the Civ. P. RuLEs, 1938, published in Supplement No. 2 to the Palestine
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number of ordinances regulating criminal procedure.23 The former
was promulgated by the Chief Justice of Palestine and the latter was
enacted by the High Commissioner (both Englishmen). They fol-
lowed closely contemporary English models, with one significant
exception: no provision was made for jury trial in either civil or
criminal cases. On the civil side, the jury was, of course, virtually
extinct in England by this time (1938). On the criminal side, perhaps
the decision was attributable to England's status as an alien ruler
increasingly at odds with the Arab. and Jewish population. Un-
doubtedly, the jury system works best where government is "of the
people" and where the criminal law is regarded as a means of
protecting person and property rather than as an instrument of
foreign domination.24 Whatever the reason, jury trial was not adopted
in Palestine and so not only were the rules of civil procedure drafted
without any thought- of application in jury cases, but- also they- were
used, administered, amended, et cetera, by lawyers with no carry
over of "jury-thinking" from criminal practice.
Since obtaining independence, there has been no basic change in
Israeli civil procedure. The first legislative enactment of the Pro-
visional Council of State included the following reception clause:
The law which existed in, Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948)
Gazette Extraordinary No. 755 of 31st January 1938. Important also are the
EvDENcE ORDINANCE 1 LAws OF PALESTINE 670; Ordinance No. 38 of 1940, and the
CounT's OrnDiNANCE, Palestine Gazette No. 1032 of 25 July 1940. The latter two
items are reprinted in SALANT, CRIMINAl. PROCEDURE AND PRACrICE IN PALESTINE 250,
275 (1947).
23. Most importantly, the Trial Upon Information Ordinance, 1 LAws OF PALESTINE
475; the Magistrates' Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1939, Palestine- Gazette No. 964
of 23rd November 1939; the Magistrates' Court Procedure Rules, 1940, Palestine
Gazette No. 979 of 15th January 1940; and the District Court (Summary Trials)
Rules, 1938, Palestine Gazette No. 757 of 10th February 1938, all reprinted in
SALANT Op. cit. supra note 22.
24. Cf. United States v. Seagraves, 100 F. Supp. 424 (D. Guam 1951), holding
omission of right to jury trial in Guam's organic act was deliberate, and observing
that "the jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the responsibilities of
jurors, a responsibility which it is hard for people not brought up in fundamentally
popular governments at once to acquire." Id. at 425. The same idea is expressed in
Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1921). Juries are used in Australia and
Canada and were, to some extent, in British India in cases involving Englishmen. See
INDrA CODE OF CaM!. P. §§ 29-32, 266-88 (1898).
"Th6, fasciiating collection of privy council cases in HOLLANDER, COLONIAL JUSTICE
(1961), suggests considerable variation but no consistent pattern. See id. at 39
(Basutoland-ritual murder-jury), 40 (Bechuanaland-attempted murder-no jury), 48
(British Guiana-armed robbery-jury), 66 (Japan, Consular Colitt (1897)-murder-
argument that natural born British subject entitled to jury trial), & 86 (Swaziland-
murder-no jury). Apart from any question of the popularity of the government, it
may be decided not to import the jury when a common law system is adopted in
an area used to civil law methods. Cf. United States v. Seagraves, supra (noting
tradition of Spanish law on Guam); Gahan v. Lafitte, 3 Moore 382 (P.C. 1842) (St.
Lucia, West Indies, governed by ancient law of France save as superseded bj,
British Orders in Council, criminal trials by 3 judges and 3 assessors).
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shall remain in force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this
Ordinance or to the other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of
the Provisional Council of State, and subject to such modifications as may
result from the establishment of the State and its authorities.2 5
While there have been amendments, some of considerable importance,
no fundamental change has taken place since 1948.26 Recently, the
Civil Procedure Rules, 1963, were drafted and promulgated by the
Minister of Justice, but they generally adhere to the basic philosophy
and approach of the 1938 rules.27
In spite of anti-British feeling in the early years of the State and
the large number of lawyers with a continental background, the law
and the legal profession has a strong Anglo-American, common law
cast.2 Thus, English is a required course in the Hebrew University
Law School for students not proficient in the language. The library
25. Law and Administration Ordinance § 11 (5708-1948). English translation in
1 LAws OF THE STATE OF IsRAEL 7 (5708-1948); cf. the Mandatory Reception
Statute, Palestine Order in Council, § 46, 3 LAws OF PALESTINE, 2579 (1922),
reprinted in SALANT, op. cit. supra note 22, at 206.
26. Israel's short legal history is recounted in BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEAM OF ISRAEL
(1961); Akzin, Codification in a New State, 5 Am. J. Compf. L. 44 (1956); Yadin,
Reception and Rejection of English Law in Israel, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 59 (1962).
27. A bill for a new Code of Criminal Procedure was introduced in the Knessett by
the Minister of Justice in May 1963. This proposal derives in considerable part from a
draft prepared in 1959 by Harvard-Brandeis Co-Operative Research for Israel's Legal
Development (1959). For accounts of this unusual foreign-aid program, see Akzin,
supra note 26, at 73; and Laufer, Co-operation between Harvard and Israel in the
Field of Legal Drafting, 41 A.B.A.J. 969 (1955). The 1963 bill retains the basic adver-
sary-accusatory, non-jury system but makes some far-reaching changes in detail, notably
an increased opportunity for discovery by the defendant and provisions encouraging him
to plead factually. Generally spekaing, criminal procedure lies within the exclusive
competence of the Knessett whereas the Minister of Justice may make rules of civil
procedure.
28. It was seriously contended as recently as 1956 that the Israeli Supreme Court
was bound by post-1948 decisions of the English House of Lords on the theory that
this is the ultimate authority on the content of "the common law," Yadin, supra note
26, at 70-71; cf. Akzin, supra note 26 at 54-55. Referring to the preference of Israeli
judges and lawyers for common law methods and their resistance to codification,
despite the fact that many of them are "civilians" by training, Professor Akzin speaks
of the "enthusiasm of the neophyte" and suggests that ex-continental jurists find
common law methods "more work but also more fun." He says that at present English
influence is waning and American gaining. Id. at 67.
As further evidence of the pervasiveness of common law ideas see the Israeli
opinions summarized in Appendix G. See also Sussman, The Role of the Judge in
Directing Civil Proceedings, 1962 INsTITuTE FOR LrEisLA.v REsEAnCH AND COM-
PARAv E LAw, IsRAEuR EPORTS TO THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CONI-
PARATivr LAw 35 (The Hebrew University Student's Press ed.) (judge of the Israeli
Supreme Court deplores "sporadic attempts to supersede the English [i.e., adversary]
system" in the name of anti-colonialism); Attorney-General v. Berkowitz [1959], C. A.
360 (English summary in Appendix G). "[T]he fact that the courts of Israel are not
obliged to adopt the principles of English common law holus bolus should not be
interpreted as meaning that some of the finest principles ... should not be emulated."
The particular principle emulated in this case was the trespasser-licensee-inviteo
distinction in landowners' liability cases.
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contains many more English and American than Hebrew books, in-
cluding most of the national reporter system, many of our law reviews,
Wigmore, Williston, Prosser, et cetera. There are fewer French,
German and Spanish titles, principally in the fields of Roman law,
comparative law, international law, and jurisprudence. Several
opinions of the Israeli Supreme Court are printed in Appendix G from
which the reader may judge for himself the persistence of English
substantive rules and habits of legal thought.
However, like all young nations, Israel has a strong desire to assert
her independence.2 Unlike many young nations, she enjoys a level
of culture and intelligence, both among the general population and,
more importantly in the present connection, among the legal pro-
fession, that is very high indeed; and this, coupled with the eclectic
bent of the Jewish people, has produced a number of innovations and
variations on the basic English model that are worthy of serious study
by anyone interested in legal procedure. The remainder of this
article is concerned with a number of these that seem to bear some
relation to the absence of a jury. Since the article is not intended
as a general survey of Israeli procedure but rather to suggest possible
changes in American systems, references are made to repealed and
proposed Israeli rules as well as to existing law.
Emphasis on Writing
Although several references have been made to the principle of
orality in Austrian civil procedure, it, in fact, relies far more heavily
upon pencil and paper than do the common law systems. First and
foremost, there is the Protokoll expressing the judge's interpretation
of the testimony and argument. Also, there are the expert's Gutachten
and counsers pleadings and Schriftsiitze. Although, technically, these
do not become a part of the record until incorporated by reference
during an oral hearing, once this is done there is little doubt that the
documents have more lasting importance than anything said about
them. The point was made that the judicial process in Austria is
essentially a matter of reviewing and deciding on the basis of a file
meticulously and disjointedly compiled-a process obviously impossi-
ble so long as jury trial is the matrix of the system. It is submitted
that some features of Israeli procedure tend to move it in the direction
of the Austrian.
judge's Notes
The 1938 Rules of Civil Procedure contain the following provisions:
29. Cf. Akzin, supra note 26, at 66: "a certain intellectual pride which does not
take kindly to the idea that the ancient Jewish people, so steeped in a rich juristic
tradition of its own, should simply copy the legal institutions of another nation."
1965 ]
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193. The presiding judge shall record the evidence of each witness in nar-
rative form, and shall sign the record at the end of each sitting.
194. The court, may, of its own motion or on the application of any party
or his advocate, take down any particular question and answer, if
there appears to be any special reason for so doing.
195. Where objection is taken to any question put to a witness, the objector
shall state his reason for the objection, the party desiring to put the
question shall answer such objection and the court shall then decide
on the admissibility of the question. The court shall, if requested by
either party, and may of its own motion, record the question and its
decisibn together with a note of the arguments.
197. Where any judge is prevented by any cause from concluding a trial
of an action, another judge may deal with any evidence taken down
under the foregoing rules as if such evidence had been taken down
or heard by him, and may proceed with the action from the stage at
which his predecessor left it.
200. The presiding judge shall record any application or submission made
by any party at the hearing of the action or any proceeding therein.
These sections are interpreted literally to require the judge to keep
the record in his own handwriting as the hearing proceeds, including
therein the gist of each important question and answer, submissions
of counsel and court rulings with the reasons therefor. Though it
is not required, some judges read more or less audibly as they write
and ask counsel and witnesses if the writing is correct.
This method of record-keeping originated because of the un-
availability and expense of shorthand reporters, and currently there
are proposals to abandon it.30 The defects are obvious: it is often
painfully slow and'much "demeanor" evidence is lost. Worse, the
constant interruptions so the judge may "catch-up" break the flow
of the examination and give a dishonest witness too much time to
think. Apparently none of the judges follow the continental practice
of waiting until the witness has finished, or reached a natural break-
ing point, before summarizing the testimony.
But are there not some offsetting good points? The judge is en-
couraged, even forced, to play an active, vocal part in the trial.
Arguably this contributes to his understanding and to greater preci-
sion. Here is an excerpt from a trial I watched:
Counsel: "How far were you from the plaintiff, in meters"?
Witness: "In meters? (helplessly) I don't know ...."
The Court: "Would you say to that table? Or to the window"?
30. The IsnALi Civ. P. RULEs, 1963, authorizes the use of shorthand reporters, and
also electronic recording devices, but their actual use is still very rare. I have been
told that there are only about two dozen Hebrew shorthand reporters in the entire
country, and that the services of most of these are required by the Knessett.
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Witness: "Yes, about that, the window."
The Court: "Will counsel agree that that is about four meters"?
Counsel: "Yes."
The Court: (muttering and writing) "I was about four meters
away.
Very likely, the same expedient would have occurred to counsel
and perhaps the incident illustrates more than anything else the
readiness of an Israeli judge to participate in the examination. But
more difficult situations can be easily imagined and an American
judge, even though his greater experience may suggest a possible
solution that counsel overlooked, would probably remain silent.31
The Israeli judge, on the other hand, is impelled by the necessity that
he write something down to intervene in order to get it straight and
get it definite. It is only human to prefer to record "4 M" instead of
"I don't know," but shorthand reporters and tape recorders are not
allowed such preferences.
I would not seriously suggest that we fire our court reporters and
make judges keep the record. But it might be interesting to try
something like the Austrian Protokoll system. Let the examination
proceed as at present with no recording other than the judge's abbre-
viated personal notes. At suitable intervals let him dictate a narrative
account of the testimony in the presence of counsel and witnesses,
and any misunderstandings or disputes about what was said could be
cleared up by on-the-spot re-examination. Possibly a verbatim short-
hand or electronic record of testimony could be kept in addition
to the dictated Protokoll, but only as an ultimate source and with the
understanding that the Protokoll is the primary record. This would
not differ much from the present practice in judge-tried cases where
the judge makes his decision on the basis of his notes, and a
transcript of the shorthand record is called for only if there is an
appeal. The added requirement of keeping a Protokoll would give
counsel a chance to correct errors and omissions in the judge's notes
and, above all, encourage more active participation by the judge.
I should now mention that at least one member of the Supreme
Court of Israel, justice Sussmann, vigorously deplores the propensity
of Israeli trial judges to actively participate in the conduct of the
case and the examination of witnesses, regarding such activism as
incompatible with the adversary system.' It is a mistake, however,
31. E.g., State v. Duggan, 215 Ore. 151, 333 P.2d 907 (1958), although the
omission of proof there was seemingly attributable to deliberate tactics rather than
inexperience. See Linde, Criminal Law-1959 Oregon Survey, 39 ORE. L. R . 161,
173-74 (1960), urging that trial judges recognize a responsibility to aid in full de-
velopment of the facts.




to think that the adversary system requires utter passivity on the
part of the judge-that he "speak only when spoken to."a3 The hall-
mark of the inquisitorial system is judicial direction, not judicial
participation; and this, together with something of an idea that a
lawyer's ultimate loyalty is to "the law," or "the truth," or "the court,"
rather than to his client, is its weakness.4 So long as counsel direct
the trial-select witnesses, decide on the order, in which they will be
called, decide on the framework of the examination of each-the
essential adversary character is retained. Occasional, even frequent,
judicial requests for clarification or further ventilation of a subject
opened up by counsel are not inconsistent with counsel direction and,
if anything, are likely to help him present his case.35 The greatest
argument for an adversary system is that it tends to insure full,
vigorous presentation, and not that the more skillful counsel deserves
to win. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand Justice Sussmann's
objection to a case in which, after the parties had rested, the judge, at
plaintiff's request, recalled a witness and elicited inadvertently omit-
ted but crucial testimony. Certainly this was on more than an
exercise of the court's discretion to grant a motion to reopen,3 6 and
not a matter of the judge turning into an advocate for one of the
parties.
A final point. It may be argued that while active participation
in questioning is not likely to affect the judge's impartiality, it might
be misunderstood by lay jurors. This is an additional argument for
devising different rules of procedure for jury and nonjury cases.
Introduction of Evidence in Writing
Certain provisions of the Israeli law along with a draft code of
evidence prepared by the Harvard-Israeli Research Project? suggest
33. Fuller, supra note 21, at 41.
34. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. "[T]he [German] procedural system
we have outlined does not make for notably vigorous performance by counsel. Moreover,
the education of lawyers tends against their full identification with clients as com-
batants .... " Kaplan, 9 BUFFALo L. REv. at 413.
35. Fuller, supra note 21, at 41. "A more active participation by the judge-assum-
ing it stops short of a pre-judgment of the case-can therefore enhance the meaning
and effectiveness of an adversary presentation."
36. American cases suggest that denial of the motion to reopen might well have
been an abuse of discretion. See 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 104-05 (1955) and cases cited
therein. See also Sanders v. Ryan, 112 Ind. App. 470, 41 N.E.2d 833 (1942) (error
to deny- plaintiff motion to reopen to introduce proof that negligent driver was acting
within scope of his employment by defendant, the motion being made after a verdict
had been directed for defendant because of lack of evidence on this point). Lenhoff
notes a reluctance in English and American courts to recognize that the judge has
power to call a witness on his own motion. Lenhoff, supra note 8, at 326. Kaplan
suggests in passing that the authorities are "one way and the other." Kaplan, 9
Bur Aro L. REv. at 423.
37. See note 27 supra.
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a movement away from the "play" concept of a trial and toward the
idea of compiling a file upon which to base judgment.
For example, Part VII of the Evidence Ordinance-Evidence of
Experts-added in 1954, requires that each expert submit a written
report of his opinion as to matters of science, research, et cetera.38
This often, though certainly not always, discourages a demand for
his "live" examination in court. Second, the Evidence Ordinance also
has an official documents provision, 9 which going little beyond
present American rules,4° offers the advantage of eliminating a neces-
sity for formal appearances by an authentication witness. Third,
there is the Protection of Children Law, requiring the police and the
courts to obtain permission from a "youth interrogator," (a social
worker) before questioning, or hearing as a witness, a child under
fourteen years of age charged with offenses against morality.41 The
act presumably contemplates that such permission ordinarily will be
withheld and the child will be examined in private by a youth
interrogator. Finally, the draft code proposals of the Harvard-Israel
Research Project envisioned a single judge investigatory process,
whereby a court composed of three judges or more would be per-
mitted to impose upon one of them the duty of hearing testimony, or
of inspection, such individual duties to be considered as if they had
been performed by the full bench. The above items are set forth at
length in Appendix E.
Psychologists will probably have a higher opinion than lawyers
of the youth interrogator law. The wisdom of admitting the record
of an examination carried out by a non-lawyer, primarily motivated
to protect and diagnose or treat the child seems very doubtful.42
If the welfare of the child precludes his appearance in court maybe
it would be better to dispense with his testimony altogether, though
of course in cases of the kind contemplated by the law the child
victim's testimony will usually be very important. All the more reason
to worry about its accuracy. Actually the merits of the law are not
my concern. The point is that the admission of such evidence would
be unthinkable in a jury case. If the law is a good one, it is because
the youth interrogator's report will be weighed by a professional
38. 8 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 89, 90-91 (5714-1953).
39. 10 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 10 (5716-1954/55).
40. Cf. OaE. REV. STAT. §§ 43.330, 43.370 (1963); Um~onM RuLES OF EVmENCE §§
63(15),(16),(17) & 68; Swearingen, How The Adoption of The Uniform Rules of
Evidence Would Affect The Law of Evidence in Oregon: Rules 62-66, 42 ORE. L. REV.
200, 229-33 (1963).
'41. 9 LAWs OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 102 (5715-1954/55).
42. Yehudai v. The Attorney-General, in Appendix G, suggests some misgivings about
the law on the part of the Israeli court. Moshe Green v. the Attorney General, supra




judge keenly aware of the dangers involved. Again an argument for
different standards for jury and non-jury trials.
The Harvard proposals came in for some criticism by a reviewing
conference z and their enactment was never seriously considered.
Justice Sussmann asked, "How can a court of three judges discharge
the task of weighing evidence... if it has not seen the witness nor
perused the document?" Mr. Joseph Laufer pointed out that three
judge courts are authorized only in very important cases and all the
conferees agreed that section 26, at least, should be used only in very
exceptional circumstances. I mention these abortive proposals be-
cause they so closely resembled the Austrian device of proof taking by
deputized judges and so suggest the possibility of domesticating
civil law methods. Note that the objection to the proposal has nothing
to do with the adversary-inquisitorical dichotomy but is simply that
the whole court ought to see the witness. The Austrians recog-
nize the force of this and employ the device relatively infrequently.
It is principally used for routine witnesses and always with the
possibility of re-examination before the adjudicating court if the
testimony turns out to be crucial or counsel disputes its validity. So
limited and safeguarded, the practice could be a simplifier and
expeditor of common law trials. It suggests the possibility of col-
lecting much routine evidence by deposition in advance of trial,
before a judge of an inferior court, or even a court reporter, and
limiting the trial to an intensive examination of the crucial witnesses.
The only change in existing American deposition rules would be an
elimination of the requirement that the witness be unavailable before
the deposition may be introduced at the trial." That, plus the will-
ingness of counsel to submit part of the case in documentary form;
doubtful tactics before a jury but by no means out of the question
in a judge-tried case.
Written Closing Arguments
An amendment to the Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure in 1952
authorized the court to order the parties to submit closing arguments
in writing, and, reportedly, this is now a regular practice. The
writing may be in lieu of oral argument or in addition to it.
An eminent barrister recently deplored comparable departures from
43. This conference met on July 22-23 and August 20-21, 1963, and was attended
.by Professors A. Leo Levin, John M. Maguire and E. M. Morgan, Mr. Justice Joel
Sussmann and Judge Zvi Alan, Dr. Julius Sichel, and Mr. Joseph Laufer. A mimeo-
graphed copy of the record of the conference, containing the text of the draft bill,
was made available to me by the Israeli Ministry of Justice.
44. Compare FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(d) and ORE. REv. STAT. § 45.250 (1963) (generally




the tradition of complete orality in English courts. He argues that
(1) the parties cannot see and hear that their cases are being fully
presented and so justice is not "manifestly seen to be done," and (2)
that there is a good deal of waste motion in that counsel must cover
each point of the case in their written arguments even though the
court generally will base its decision on only one or two issues. In
short, counsel do not know when they are "pushing at an open door."
45
Many Israeli judges, with English backgrounds, echo these senti-
ments, especially the latter one. But how about it? Even where argu-
ment is wholly oral, counsel must work up and be prepared to argue
the whole case even though the court decides to concbntrate on
only one or two facets. Is the extra effort of writing out the argu-
ments perhaps worthwhile as a check on a court that may be prone
to over-simplification? Or, if the testimony has left parts of the case
too clear for argument, there is nothing to prevent the court saying
so and requesting written argument on specified issues. And does
exclusive reliance on oral argument put too great a premium on mere
glibness?
Seemingly, neither the English nor the Israelis make any significant
use of our appellate practice of a comprehensive written brief sup-
plemented by selective oral argument. Perhaps most American
lawyers would resist frequent use of such an elaborate procedure in
the trial court, but it is at least a possibility for important cases if
they are not tried to a jury.
Reasoned Judgments
Rule of Civil Procedure 205 provides: "Judgments in defended
actions shall contain a concise statement of the case, the courts'
findings on material- facts, the points for determination, the decision
thereon, and the reasons for such decision."
A typical Israeli trial court judgment, prepared in compliance
with this rule, is printed in Appendix F. It may be interesting to
compare this with the Austrian judgment (Appendix D) and with
representative judgments of American trial courts.
The following Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure indicate the con-
siderable effect that the use of "reasoned judgments" has upon the
work of the appellate courts.
341. Where the evidence upon the record is sufficient to enable the appel-
late court to pronounce judgment, the appellate court may, after re-
settling the issues, if necessary, finally determine the action, not-
withstanding that the judgment of the court from whose decree the
45. MEGAuty, LAWYER AND LrinANT IN ENGLAND 167-73 (1962), (praising "'compre-
hensive orality" of English procedure).
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appeal is preferred has proceeded wholly upon some ground other
than that on which the appellate court proceeds.
342. Where the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omit-
ted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact,
which appears to the appellate court essential to the right decision
of the suit upon the merits, the appellate court may, if necessary,
frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the court from whose
decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such
court to take additional evidence required; and such court shall pro-
ceed to try such issues, and shall return the evidence to the appellate
court together with the findings thereon and the reasons therefor.
344. (1) The party to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce addi-
tional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court.
But if:
(a) the court from whose decree or order the appeal is preferred
has refused to admit such evidence which ought to have been
admitted, or
(b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced
or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce
judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate
court may allow such evidence or document to be produced,
or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an ap-
pellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission.
Section 10 of the Evidence Ordinance is also in point:
When evidence which is not admissible in proof of a criminal charge
has been admitted by error or inadvertence, such evidence shall not be
used in proof of the charge nor shall any judgment be based thereon:
nevertheless, the fact that such evidence has been heard by the court
shall not be held to invalidate the judgment unless, in the opinion
of the court, the accused would not have been convicted if such
evidence had not been given or there was no other sufficient evidence
to support the conviction apart from the evidence.
Examination of the opinions of the Israeli Supreme Court in Ap-
pendix G suggests a realistic effort to discover and evaluate what
actually happened below. Not infrequently, an American appellate
court directs its attention to a case that never was.46 This is un-
avoidable so long as the opaqueness of our trial court judgments
forces our appellate courts to proceed upon questionable assumptions:
for example, that errors in procedure and in admitting and excluding
evidence have affected the decision below; that if there is evidence
46. E.g., compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928),
with the expanded account of the accident in Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH.
L. REv. 1 (1953); see generally LLEmvWEYN, Tim CoMn oN LAw TRAD ToIN-Dcmn1Nr
APpErs 28 (1960) ("A Frozen Record from Below"); Lusk, Forty-five Years of
Article VII, Section 3 Constitution of Oregon, 35 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1955).
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in the record that would support a finding of certain facts, which
facts would justify the judgment below if a certain rule of law were
correctly applied to them, then such facts were found on that evi-
dence and the rule of law was applied to them.47 These assumptions
may conceal errors in factfinding--the jury may in fact have drawn
untenable inferences from evidence other than that regarded by the
appellate court as supporting the findings-and may require reversals
and remands of cases correctly decided below. The "harmless error"
concept 8 and the use of findings of fact and conclusions of law in
judge-tried cases are fairly efficacious remedies for these evils al-
though there is a difference between knowing what the trial judge
decided and why he decided it.49 Remands for retrial are rare in
Israel.
Four ways in which Israel's trial procedure emphasizes writing to
a greater extent than the United States trial procedure have been
presented-the judge-kept record, introduction of testimony in written
47. To make the point clearer, suppose that if fact situation A- exists, the court may,
in its discretion, give judgment X. Consider: (1) the trial court rejected the evidence
pointing to A and found fact situation B existed and gave judgment X only because it
erroneously thought the law ran, "if B then X;" (2) the trial court found A but gave
judgment X because it erroneously thought this was required (i.e., not realizing that
the correct rule of law required an exercise of discretion). For an example of an
affirance on the ground that the trial court "may have based its judgment upon cer-
tain evidence in the record," see Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. v. S. J. Kibler & Bros. Co.,
97 Ohio St. 262, 119 N.E. 733 (1918). For an example of a seemingly unnecessarily
complex retrial, see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 154-
56 (1963). Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), in which the Supreme Court
attempts to define the situations in which the federal courts must grant an evidentiary
hearing in connection with habeas corpus review of state court rulings admitting
confessions.
48. See LLEwELLYN, op. cit. supra note 46; Lusk, supra note 46.
49. Consider these sections of the HAnv.aRD-Isa.aL DrA-r CODE OF EViDFNCE:
Section 13. Admission of Inadmissible Evidence. A court of appeals shall not
reverse a judgment on the ground that evidence inadmissible under this law was
admitted by the court below unless it is satisfied that the other evidence remaining
before that court was insufficient to support its decision. HYvAD-IsRAEL. PRoJECrT
DRAF-r CODE OF EViDENCE § 13 (1959).
Section 14. Refusal to Admit Admissible Evidence. A Court of appeal shall not
reverse a judgment on the ground that the court below refused to admit evidence ad-
missible under this law, unless it is persuaded that the admission of that evidence would
have resulted in a different judgment. I-Av~im-IsnAL PnojEcT CODE OF EVIDENCE §
14 (1959).
At the conference, supra note 43, Professor Morgan commented: "The statement in
the comment that [these sections] are in accord with the common law is questionable to
say the least. Certainly the A.L.I. lawyers and judges believed that the common law
goes no further than exercising a judgment whether the questioned evidence had
or would have had a substantial effect upon the finding. Is it any easier to guess the
effect on the mind of a judge than of a juror?" And Justice Sussmann: "The two
sections cannot be identical because in § 14 the appellate court can only guess what
effect the excluded evidence would have had, while in § 13 the effect must be
gauged from the judgment under appeal."




form, written closing argument, and reasoned judgments. None of
these are compatible with jury trials, but each is an everyday feature
of Israers common law based procedure. There has been some con-
sideration of the pros and cons of each item. Generalizing, it comes
to this: if the goal is an impressionistic, unintellectualized reaction
to the whole case, then a system of nailing down each point in
writing, with the inevitable delays involved in so doing is contraindi-
cated; if precise fact finding and detailed logical analysis is desired,
then all the writing is to the good. It is not suggested that either of
these basic attitudes is obviously the correct one. Perhaps impres-
sionism is desirable in one kind of case, articulate analysis in an-
other.50 The latter seems likely to be preferable in the kind of case
that is likely to be tried to the court as things now stand in the
United States.
INFomALrrY-EPisoDIC TuL
Our concept of the trial, necessary when there is a jury, is of a
single, continuous, "live" presentation of all the evidence. Provisions
respecting expert testimony, official records, and the like, discussed
under the preceding head, suggest the possibility of a system of trial
to the court where the spadework is done on paper and the judge
hears only the key witnesses. Further, once the jury is gone, and if
adequate notes are kept, there is no need to hear all of the case at one
time. Some Israeli practices and provisions should be considered in
this light.
Adjourned Sessions
A typical Israeli personal injury trial may occupy five or six days
in court spread over a period of three or four months. Despite an
initial surface resemblance, however, the system is not like the
Austrian. We saw that there the usual practice is to resolve one
issue, liability, and then hold a conference to assess the thus arrived at
posture of the case and to decide where to go from here. In Israel
50. See Curtis, supra note 2; BLoM-CoopER, THE A-6 Mutmna 14-15 (1963), com-
menting on denial of jury's request for a transcript of the testimony in a lengthy murder
trial: "Why is it that a jury is supposed to reach its verdict on the evidence heard
in court without having the chance to check the possible introduction of bias and
rumor through reference to the only reliable guide-the transcript of the words
actually spoken? The English system leans heavily on the arrival of a verdict by way
of general impressions rather than scrupulous examination of the testimony. When
Mr. Justice Stable, in the case of Victor Terry, who was convicted in 1961 of the
capital murder of a bank clerk in Worthing, gave the jury in that case a transcript
of complicated medical evidence, marking certain passages touching on the plea of
diminished responsibility, the Court of Criminal Appeal deprecated the practice. Now
Mr. Justice Gorman was conforming to that directive by telling the jurors, 'No, you
do not' get a copy of the transcript."
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all the issues are made up in advance of any proof-taking by a
system of pleadings and motions essentially like our own. Amend-
ments during trial are no more frequent or readily allowed than in our
system. The dispersion of hearings is primarily a consequence of
docket setting practices. In the Jerusalem district court, for example,
the trial docket is rigidly set for three months at a time, each case
being assigned to commence on a date certain. Supposedly, sufficient
time is alloted to hear a case on successive days once it starts, but per-
haps because of the obsessive fear of wasting judicial time5' the esti-
mate is usually too short, and instead of an idle judge waiting for his
next scheduled case, the time allotted for the first case generally runs
out with only half or two-thirds of the proof in. Then, because of the
tightness of the docket, the next available date is usually two or three
months ahead. 52
The practice respecting continuances also plays a part in spreading
out the case. There is no provision for severance of issues for separate
trial save by consent of the parties. This is rare, at least in the
Jerusalem district, and when it occurs, severance is only with respect
to proof taldng. Thus, there is no Zwischenurteil.53 However, counsel
regularly parcel their presentation for the convenience of the wit-
nesses-proof of negligence today, medical witnesses tomorrow, et
cetera. If things move faster than anticipated and he comes to the
end of his negligence evidence at eleven in the morning (the court
sits from nine to one-thirty), the court will usually be quite lenient
about granting a continuance until the following day.M Likewise, if
after hearing two or three witnesses counsel suggest an adjournment
to talk settlement, the court will probably accede.
Israeli judges are unhappy about the situation described above,
largely because of the long delays in disposing of cases, but, in the
case of at least one judge, also on the ground of lack of continuity.
The delay point seems purely mechanical in origin and not beyond
51. Cf. MEOAm-z, op. cit. supra note 45, at 77-89 (1962).
52. See chronologies in Appendix C.
53. Apparently severance of issues is fairly common in the Tel Aviv District Court
and I have been told of at least one case there in which judgment was given on the
liability issue, and an appeal taken therefrom, before the damages issue was taken up.
54. The attitude of the Israeli bench is illustrated by the following vignette.
Magistrate's Court Procedure Rule 266 (regulating procedure in minor criminal cases)
originally provided that the court might adjourn a hearing at any time "in its discre-
tion." In 1952 the Minister of Justice promulgated an amendment limiting adjourn-
ments to certain enumerated situations-non-appearance of counsel, unavailability of
witnesses, etc.-and then only if necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The
seemingly manifest purpose of the amendment was to tighten up on continuances
but it has been construed to mean just the opposite, i.e., that counsel is entitled to
a continuance as of right on a showing that a material witness is not present at the
trial without any reference to why counsel did not insure his presence.
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the power of human ingenuity to solve.P The continuity point, how-
ever, raises once again our basic question about the judicial process.
If a judge is supposed to approximate a jury and react to the whole
case, then certainly continuity is essential. If he is supposed to com-
pile and then examine a file it is not. The quality of the file may even
be, improved if there are intervals to stop and think as the case
proceeds.
Hearing Witnesses Outside the Courtroom.
The following provisions were included in the 1938 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
190. The evidence of the witnesses in attendance shall be taken orally in
open court in the presence of and under the direction and superten-
denee of the court.
202. When a witness whose evidence is necessary to be taken for trial of
an action in a civil case in any court is the Rais of Ulema or one of
the Bishops of the Latin, Orthodox or other Eastern or African
churches or one of the two Chief Rabbis, his evidence shall be taken
at his place of residence or at some other place that shall appear to
be more convenient, or in private in the chambers of the court before
a judge or such other suitable person as may be appointed for the
purpose by the court in the same manner as the evidence of a witness
about to leave Palestine may be taken, and the evidence %vhen so taken
may then be read at any hearing of the action and treated for all
purposes as if it had been taken in open court.
The Harvard-Israel Project draft evidence code made this proposal:
Section 24: Testimony Outside Court. The court may hear testimony at the
residence of a witness or at a place other than the courtroom and even
outside its jurisdiction, whether because of respect for the witness, or of his
illness, or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the court.
Apart from stylistic objections the only reaction of the conference
was to suggest that it be made clear that such proof taking be on
notice to the parties and with opportunity to cross-examine.
55. Simplest would be more realistic initial time allowances and acceptance of
an occasionally idle judge as the lesser evil. If this seems unwise, surely experience
must permit fairly accurate forecasts of the number of cases that will be completed
within the time initially allotted and of the number of cases that are set for trial
but never tried. Why not leave a reasonable number of unassigned judge days in each
week to be used for uncompleted, carry-over cases? And why not set an uncompleted
case for a date only a week or so ahead on the assumption that some case set for that
time will be settled and make room for it? Even if two or three such attempts were
necessary to find an open day, the possibility of completing the case in three weeks
seems better than waiting three months. Costs are very substantial in Israel-I am
told that the courts, at least in Jerusalem, operate at a profit-and one would think
that they might be so manipulated as to reduce the number of last minute settle-





The situation with respect to pre-trial conferences has until recently
resembled that existing in many American states. The judge assigned
to the case usually called counsel in for informal exploration of
settlement possibilities and attempted to narrow the case to a few
bona fide issues by encouraging stipulations and admissions. But
beyond exerting moral force, and perhaps some rattling of the costs
sabre, he had little power to compel cooperation. The Civil Procedure
Rules, 1963, contain the following new provisions designed to
strengthen the hand of the judge:
Rule 143. The judge at a pre-trial is authorized-
(1) To verify if the pleadings have been drawn up according to law, to
strike out anything which is unnecessary and to ascertain what are the
questions which are really the questions in controversy between the parties;
(2) To determine, after verification with the parties, the means by which
the allegations are to be proved, (and) the admissibility of the evidence,
and also to order the hearing of evidence outside the area of jurisdiction
of the court in which the proceedings are to take place or outside the
boundaries of the state;
Rule 146. Where an application has been made for the delivery of interro-
gatories, the judge may, either on the application of one of the parties or
of his own motion, order that the party to whom the application is made
be examined before him on oath or by affirmation on the questions submit-
ted to him, whether in addition to or instead of the interrogatories, and
testimony so heard may be submitted in the trial as evidence against him;
where such an application is submitted by the two contending parties, the
party who is entitled to open in the action shall be examined first.
Rule 147. (a) The judge may order a particular party to appear in
person, or, in the case of a corporation, its director, manager or any other
person who holds an office in the corporation howsoever the judge may see
fit; he may also order that a particular party whose presence is not re-
quired for the hearing should be exempt from appearance.
(b) The consequences of non-appearance in a pre-trial shall be as the
consequences of non-appearance in a trial.
A proponent of the new rules explains 143(1), 146 and 147 as
follows: Israeli lawyers overwork the general denial; we think that
under sworn, personal examination by a judge, a defendant will admit
many allegations as to which his counsel has put the plaintiff on his
proof for tactical reasons or out of too much caution; then as word gets
around about such examinations, embarrassing both to the party
making the admissions and counsel who exposed his client to the
ordeal, pleadings will become more precise with the resultant shorten-
ing and simplification of trials.
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There is some question as to the precise meaning of Rule 143(2).
Does it merely contemplate advance rulings on objections to save
time at the trial? If so, it does not go beyond what has always been
possible at pre-trial. Or does it mean that counsel are to disclose how
they intend to go about proving their allegations and the judge is
to decide what witnesses, documents, et cetera, are to be presented,
that is, make a ruling like the Austrian Beweisbeschluss? If so, that
trenches dangerously on counsel's power to decide how best to
present his case-a power at the heart of the adversary system.
Has the regulation of the pre-trial conference anything to do with
mode of trial-jury or nonjury? If trial is to the jury, seeking an
impressionistic response, a complete picture ought to be presented
in court, including undisputed facts necessary to full understanding
of the case and perhaps even some marginally relevant background
material. Arguably counsel should be allowed to present all his case
through the dramatic medium of live testimony and not be limited
to a dry statement by the judge that "this, this, and this stand ad-
mitted."-" Where trial is to the court, however, especially in the kind
of case I have spoken of as calling for analysis of a file, proof of
undisputed facts is a waste of time. Hence pre-trial devices aimed
at isolation and sharp definition of issues are more suitable to such
cases.
Therefore, if Rule 143(2) does mean something like a Beweisbes-
chluss, this is much less objectionable where trial is to the court
because the method of presenting the case (such matters as the selec-
tion of witnesses for human appeal and the use of dramatic means
of proof) is far less important. Counsel should have the right to
decide for themselves what evidence will best persuade a jury, but
in nonjury cases, the judge is the one to be persuaded and it is a
convenience to counsel more than anything else if he indicates in
advance what is most likely to succeed.
Interspersed Argument
According to justice Sussmann:
In a Continental court you can, of course, frequently hear an advocate
addressing the court in the middle of the case on any question of law or fact,
and so it was in this country even after 1937, where the bench often
acquiesced in such piecemeal conduct of trial. According to the rules made
in 1938, the plaintiff opens and calls his witnesses, and then the defendant
calls his witnesses and sums up his case, and the plaintiff replies. This is,
of course, the English system, but in the early forties, one could still find
56. Cf. Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment,
31 OnE. L. REv. 267, 275-78 (1952).
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both bar and bench ignoring the rule-whether from ignorance or otherwise-
and conducting cases in the Continental manner.57
The European practice is more a matter of tolerated extra-legal
tradition than codified procedure;- court and counsel "just know" how
far to go, and what is "judicious" interweaving." But how do you
legislate the nuances of a tradition?59 It is more probable that the
practice may develop naturally and gradually as American judges and
lawyers come to think about trial increasingly less in terms of jury-
oriented rules, than it will be the product of deliberate legislative
innovation.
BRoADER ADMIssIBILrrY OF EVmENCE
Allusion was made at the start of this article to the generally
accepted belief that the jury is the mother of the exclusionary rules
of evidence. Under this head will be discussed a number of respects
in which the rules have been, or seem to be in the process of being,
relaxed in Israers nonjury system.
Practice
There is no question that the common law rules of evidence
57. Sussmann, The Role of the Judge in Directing Civil Proceedings in 1962
INsTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE RE EAacn AND ComARAnrvE LAW, IsRAEmL REPORTS TO
THE SnH INTERuAToNAL CONGRESS OF CoMPARATIVE LAW 35, 36.
58. See Appendix B.
59. A comparable problem exists in connection with the approach of Israeli judges
to novel tort claims. The Palestine negligence law inherited from the Turks was
very inadequate, e.g., it recognized no remedy for personal injuries. Nor was this a
lacuna permitting reference to English common law (in accordance with the Manda-
tory Reception Statute, supra note 25) as the Ottoman law was negative rather than
silent. The British sought to remedy this by the enactment of the Civil Wrongs Ordi-
nance in 1944. Civ. WnONcS OaRD. No. 36 (1944). This is a sort of legislative restate-
ment of torts, admirable in most respects, but marred in the eyes of many in that it
purports to be a complete enumeration of all wrongs actionable in Palestine, and now,
by reception, in Israel, i.e., it is a closed system without a growth principle. In conse-
quence the Israeli court has found itself unable to allow recovery for invasion of
rights of privacy, Rabinowitz v. Polyfot Ltd., [1956] C.A. 68 (English summary in
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 27, 1957), or for injuries without impact, see Nader v. Kahano-
witz, [1957] C.A. 4 (English summary in Jerusalem Post, Dec. 26, 1957). Consider
how to draft an amendment to the Civil Wrongs Ordinance that would convey the
seldom articulated but generally understood (by Americans) judicial power of crea-
tivity-but-not-free-decision.
Again, consider § 33 of the CoURTs LAW OF 1957: "(a) A court shall be guided
by a precedent established by a higher court; (b) A precedent established by the
Supreme Court binds every Court, except the Supreme Court." 11 LAws OF THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 163 (5717-1956). To my American eyes this suggests an intent to
substitute our more relaxed concept for the rigid English idea of stare decisis. But
I have talked to continentally trained Israeli jurists who understand it as an adop-
tion of the civilian idea that precedents have Qnly persuasive force. If the Knesset
meant what I think it meant, should it have incorporated Cardozo's Nature of the
Judicial Process by reference in § 33?
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(modified by statutes in numerous matters of detail of course) are
part of the law of Israel. Objections on the ground of hearsay,
opinion, not the best evidence, et cetera, are regularly made by
counsel. The judge, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
wisdom of the matter, has no choice but to rule in accordance with
the law. However, two factors tend to considerably modify the law
in practice. First is the principle that rules of evidence are not sub-
stantive directions about the value of different kinds of proof but
merely create a power in counsel to exclude certain kinds, a power
which may be conclusively waived if not promptly asserted. In
addition, many Israeli lawyers, because of civil law backgrounds, have
never developed a facility with the exclusionary rules, and the result
is that much technically excludable evidence is admitted in many
trials. As Justice Holmes said, ignorance is a great law reformer.
Secondly, as noted, Israeli trials usually run over a considerable period
of time and judges readily allow continuances to obtain witnesses.
Consequently an objection to hearsay evidence, for example, about a
fact that counsel knows to exist and to be provable by competent
evidence is much more likely to lead to prolongation of the trial than
to a failure of proof. Judges know this, and some of them frankly
bully counsel out of what they consider to be over-technical or purely
obstructive objections.
Introduction of Evidence in Writing
Passing from questions of practice, some actual modifications in the
rules of evidence will now be considered. The previously discussed
statutory innovations regarding experts' reports, official records and the
Youth Interrogator law are all relaxations of the hearsay rule and
might have been postponed for consideration here. They were not
because it seemed that the most interesting point was what they
suggested about the "file" concept of trial-the non-necessity of com-
plete, oral presentation once the jury is gone-but it should be
observed here that the wisdom of using such time-saving devices is
much clearer when the written reports are to be subjected to critical,
professional evaluation.
No "Dead Man" Rule
Section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance provides that "all persons are
competent to give evidence in all cases, and no person shall be
considered incompetent to give evidence in any case by reason of
his being a party to a civil action .... ." There is no qualification, in
the familiar American style, respecting transactions with persons now
deceased in actions against decedent's estates. A case decided during
the Mandate period recognized that a party to an action against an
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administrator was competent to testify about a contract allegedly made
with the deceased,60 noting only that such evidence should be ac-
cepted with caution and that this was in accord with what has been
the rule in England since at least 1885, and probably ever since
the lifting of the disqualification of parties.6'
Section 6 of the Evidence Ordinance provides:
No judgment shall be given in any civil case on the evidence of a single
witness unless such evidence is uncontradicted or is corroborated by some
other material evidence which in the opinion of the court is sufficient to
establish its truth.
This general section is not limited to cases involving claims against
estates, but it does supply a safeguard especially desirable in such
cases. By providing a mechanical rule for the disposition of certain
cases, and so rejecting the principle of free evaluation of evidence,
this section contradicts the central thesis of this article, for there is
no general requirement of corroboration in most American jurisdic-
tions even in jury cases.
62
Preliminary Showing of Admissibility
Because of the division of functions in a jury trial, there are situa-
tions in which the judge must first be persuaded that the factual
conditions for the admissibility of certain kinds of evidence are
satisfied before the material evidence may be presented (confessions,
dying declarations, witnesses of tender years or doubtful mental
capacity, to mention the most common). In Bashari v. Attorney
General,63 a principal witness for the prosecution was a certified
schizophrenic who had escaped from a mental hospital and for the
attempted murder of whom the defendant was on trial. After the
witness had testified, a medical expert gave testimony that if there
were corroboration on the main substance of her evidence, she should
be believed to have told the complete truth. There was such corro-
boration and the defendant was found guilty. He appealed on the
ground that it was error to permit this witness to testify before the
court had heard medical evidence as to her testimonial capacity. The
conviction was affirmed, the court saying that while the procedure
contended for by defendant is required in America and England,
this is
60. Atallah Mantoura v. Nur Michail of Khoury, [1940] C.A. 233, 8 Palestine L.
Rep. 20 (1940). The same rule has been applied since the creation of this state.
Rubashiiz v. Heller, [1958] C.A. 392, 13 Piskei Din 1925 (1958).
61. Cf. 7 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2065 (3d ed. 1940).
62. Id. § 2046 (no general rule declaring insufficiency of a single witness has found
footing in the common law). Cf. OiRE. REv. STAT. § 41.260 (1963) (direct evidence
of one witness sufficient).
63. [1962) Cr. A. 507 (English summary in Jerusalem Post, Mar. 24, 1963).
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because of the jury system in operation in those countries and the fear of
allowing laymen to hear evidence which may afterwards be declared inad-
missible. Where there are only professional judges, however, as in Israel, no
such fear exists and the procedure may be regulated according to the
greatest convenience and efficiency.6 4
Although this case deals with a question of the order of proof rather
than an extension of admissibility, it is noteworthy for its explicit
recognition of the influence of the jury on the rules of evidence.
Declarations of Unavailable Witnesses
This and the next subhead consider two proposed, but so far
unaccepted, relaxations in the exclusionary rules.
Very far-reaching exceptions to the hearsay rule were created by
statute in Massachusetts in 18986 and in England in 1938.66 These
admit evidence of declarations made of his personal knowledge by a
person now deceased (Massachusetts) or unavailable as a witness
(England). The English rule is limited to written statements and
excludes "a statement made by a person interested at a time when
proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to
any fact which the statement might tend to establish." The Mas-
sachusetts rule extends to all declarations made in good faith. The
Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence contain
comparable provisions.67
The rationale is that people generally tell the truth, even outside
of a court, and that it is less likely to do harm to admit some evidence
of questionable value than to compel decision of cases on incomplete
data or by mechanical application of rules about the burden of proof.68
A better case can be made for recognizing the exception in judge-tried
cases, as the fact cannot be escaped that it does admit uncross-
examined statements that call for special caution and skill in their
64. Another good example is Dissentchik v. the Attorney-General, [1962] Cr. A.
126, 17 Piskei Din 169 (1962) (English summary in Jerusalem Post, Feb. 27, 1963)
(in prosecution of newspaper for publication about pending murder case, court points
out danger of influencing outcome much less in Israel than where trial is by jury).
65. MAss. GENi LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (1932).
66. Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 28, § 1. Both this and the Massachusetts
law are discussed in McCosancK, EVIDENCE 630-31 (1954).
67. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 503 (1942); UNIFORM RULE Or EVIDENCE 63(4)
(c). Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 932 (1062), con-
trasts the Model Code and Uniform Rules provisions somewhat to the advantage of
the former. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Vanderbilt has made a powerful
argument for judicial adoption of the exception. Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co.,
1 N.J. 304, 63 A.2d 515 (1949).
68. MORGAN, ThE LAW OF EvmENcE: SoiM PROPOsALS FOR ITS REFoRM 40-49
(1927), reports a survey of professional opinion which showed a very large majority
of Massachusetts lawyers in favor of their rule, especially those who had had con-
siderable experience with it.
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evaluation, though neither England nor Massachusetts limit the
rule to civil cases.
While the Palestine Evidence Ordinance antedated the 1938 Eng-
lish enactment, and has never been amended to conform thereto, the
following proposal was made by the Harvard-Israel Research Project
draft code:
78. Evidence of a hearsay statement (offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated) is admissible if:
(1) the statement was made by a party or in his presence and the
evidence is offered against him; or
(2) if the statement was made:
(a) by a person who is present in court and subject to cross-
examination, whether or not he is a party or a witness; or
(b) by a person who was (duly summoned as a witness) if
the court is persuaded that he cannot be found; or
(c) by a person who is no longer alive.
At the conference held to review the draft code, Professor Maguire
observed that this section made no requirement that the declarant
speak from personal knowledge and so opened the door to "multiple-
layer hearsay" and perhaps had some reservations about admitting
hearsay solely because the declarant was unavailable, for example,
without any circumstantial indicia or reliability.70 The other conferees
accepted the basic idea of the section and in fact recommended an
even broader formulation of paragraph 2(c), which was proposed by
Judge Zvi Alon: "by someone who is unavailable as a witness because
of death, mental or physical condition, claim of privilege or for any
reason other than the culpable conduct of the proponent."7' Here the
matter stands today.
Proof of Criminal judgment in Related Civil Case
The Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure, in keeping with the usual
civil law practice,7 2 authorized joinder of a claim for damages by a
69. This is actually Professor Morgan's redraft of the originally proposed section
which confusingly suggested that the making of the statement might itself be proved
by hearsay evidence and also would have admitted self-serving declarations of a party
not present for cross-examination.
70. Conference record p. 81; see note 43 supra.
71. Id. at 82.
72. E.g., Austria: STRUFPRozssoRaNU o §§ 365-79 (1960); France: see Pugh, Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. Rv.
1, 12 (1962); Yugoslavia: CODE OF Cium. P. §§ 96-107 (English transl. 1954).
A brief account of the Austrian practice appears in ZIESEIL, KaLv- N & BucHor.z,
DELAY xu Tm CouRT 290 (1959) (Appendix D). See also Kaplan, von Mehren &
Schaeffer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 Hnv. L. REv. 1193, 1200 n.22 (1958),
stating that the limited possibility of litigating the civil claim within a criminal case is
seldom used by German plaintiffs.
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private person injured by a crime with the criminal prosecution.
This provision has been carried forward through the British and
Israeli reception statutes, but it was rarely used even during the
Mandate. Provision was made for its repeal by the Code of Criminal
Procedure introduced in the Knessett in 1963.
When it is considered that (under the usual continental practice)
the defendant must be found guilty of the criminal offense as a
necessary condition for allowance of civil relief, the danger of such
combined proceedings in a jury-tried case-throwing the full weight of
sympathy for the victim of the crime against the defendant-is self-
evident. Perhaps this danger is lessened only in degree in a judge-
tried case. Nevertheless, the ideals of efficiency and consistency of
adjudication suggest that there ought to be some connection between
civil and criminal cases arising out of the same incident. Evidently
sharing these views the advisory committee to the Minister of Justice
has proposed the following:
A Bill to Supplement the Law of Criminal Procedure
1. Where a person has been convicted in a criminal trial, the conviction
shall be admissible in any other legal proceedings, civil or criminal, as
prima facie evidence against the person so convicted of the findings of
fact which constituted the elements of the offense for which he was con-
victed.
The American Uniform Rules of Evidence make essentially the
same proposal applicable to both jury and non-jury cases.73 Certainly
the most common use would be in automobile accident cases which
are generally tried to a jury. Occasionally, there will be situations
where the civil and criminal cases should come out differently.
Suppose the defendant was plainly violating a traffic law but the
causation is obscure-the case of a child suddenly darting in front of
a speeding motorist. Perhaps it can be argued that the news that
the defendant has been found criminally guilty will blind the jury,
where it would not blind a judge, to the subtler aspects of the case.
See Tennenholz v. Poplikitz in Appendix G.
AsSSsoRs-CouRT APPOmTED EXPERTS
One of the justifications for jury trial is that it makes for judgment
in the light of everyday lay experience and local custom. But having
opted for jury trial, our system then tells the jurors they must not
73. UN Ioam RuLE oF EvmENcE 63(20). Section 2 of the proposed Israeli bill
provides for the admission at the trial of the civil case of evidence introduced at
the criminal trial either by the accused or against him if subject to cross-examnina-
tion by him. Compare Unwomv R=LE oF EvmENcE 63(3). Section 3 of the proposed




use their own knowledge. And then it makes it impossible to find out
if they have.74 So much about jury trials defies logical explanation
that perhaps we should not be unduly concerned about this example
of deviousness. In the case of a judge-tried case, however, it ought
to be possible to put the matter of supplying desirable background
information to the trier on a more scientific basis.
The Palestine Courts Ordinance, 1940, provided:
20. (1) The president of the district court or land court may, when he con-
siders that the nature of the dispute renders it desirable so to do, ap-
point assessors and such assessors shall hear the evidence and advise
the court but shall take no part in the judgment of the court.
(2) Where the dispute is of a commercial nature, the assessors shall
be persons of commercial experience.
(3) (Provisions for referee in cases dealing mainly with accounts).75
In practice, assessors were rarely used and the above provision was
repealed by the new courts law in 1957Y6
Somewhat comparable to an assessor is a neutral, court-appointed,
expert witness. Such individuals have had an interesting history in
Israel. In a personal injury case, decided in 1961, 7 the medical
experts called by plaintiff and defendant at the trial differed as to
whether plaintiffs condition was causally related to an injury negli-
gently inflicted by the defendant. Unable to decide which to believe,
the judge appointed a third doctor, believing that such an order
was authorized by a rule providing that
the court or judge may at any stage of the proceedings in a cause or matter,
direct any necessary inquiries . . . and in making such order the court or
judge may give such directions and may appoint such person or persons
to make the inquiries ... as to it or him may seem fit.78
The third doctor favored the plaintiff and judgment was given accord-
ingly. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Sussmann explains:
74. Reference is to the rule forbidding jurors to impeach their own verdict. There
is growing support for the view that the finality of verdicts is better protected by a
system that permits an inquiry into the jury deliberation, but requires tolerant evalua-
tion in the light of realistic standards, than by shutting off the most fruitful avenue of
inquiry-a system that leads capriciously to the afirmance of seriously tainted verdicts
and the overturning of fairly good ones. See State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371 P.2d
558 (1962); Note, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 363 (1958) (very good).
75. Palestine Gazette of 1940, Supp. I, No. 1032, p. 143 (English ed.). Compare
the Austrian provision: JnuBsDw-rIoNsNoRm § 7, after providing that civil cases will
generally be heard by a three-judge Senat, provides that in commercial and mining
cases one of the three shall be replaced by a lay expert.
76. Couars LAw § 48 (5717-1957), 11 LAws OF vm STATE OF ISRAEL 157, 166
(5717-1956). ,
77. United Harbor Services, Ltd. v. Liebowitz, [1960] C.A. 326, 15 Piskei Din 15
(1961).
78. ISRAELI RULE OF Civ. P. 221.
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Be it remembered that this was in 1961, when the Supreme Court had
already turned back the judge to his traditional role of a neutral arbiter
who may take no part in the struggle between the parties. It was decided
that as the trial court was not prepared, on the evidence of the plaintiff's
doctor, to find for him, the defendant was entitled to a verdict dismissing
the action, the plaintiff having failed to prove his case and it was held that
the court acted wrongly in assuming control of the case by causing a
third doctor to be called.79
This decision seems wrong. How does a judge become a partisan
by seeking further illumination from a neutral source? The argument
is that if the evidence is in equipoise the defendant wins and so, by
calling for more evidence, the judge sides with the party having the
burden of proof. But certainly only in the most formal way-indeed
no more than he would side with the other party by deciding not
to call for more evidence. I submit that rules on burden of proof
have their proper application in dictating the result where the facts
are really not discoverable, rather than in shutting out light that is
available.
Presumably as a reaction to cases like this, the Civil Procedure
Rules, 1963, introduced the following provisions respecting medical
experts.
Rule 163. A Medical Committee which will be established by the Min-
ister of Justice (henceforth-"the Minister"), on consultation with the
Minister of Health, will recommend to the Minister a list of candidates from
among medical practitioners specializing in various fields, who are suitable
for appointment as medical experts of the district courts and consent thereto,
and may also recommend the addition of a candidate to the list according to
need and the removal of a candidate from the list.
Rule 164. The Medical Committee will work alongside and in coordina-
tion with the administration of the courts in all that concerns the number of
medical experts required by every district court.
Rule 170. A plaintiff wishing to submit medical evidence on vhich to
base his claim for damages shall attach to his statement of claim an opinion
or a certificate from a doctor in accordance with form 16 of the first
schedule (henceforth-"an opinion") and with as many copies as there
are copies of the statements of claim, but he may, instead of submitting
such an opinion, apply to the court for the nomination of a medical expert
for this purpose.
Rule 171. Where a plaintiff has attached a medical opinion to his state-
ment of claim, the defendant may do one of the following:
(1) send to the plantiff, within twenty days from the day the statement
of claim was served on him, a demand that he be examined by a medical
practitioner of the defendant's choice, and if the plaintiff does not accede
to this demand the court will nominate a medical expert;
79. Sussmann, supra note 57, at 41. The allusion is to the "overactive judge" cases.
Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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(2) submit to the court together with his statement of defense-and by
leave of the court or registrar even after the statement of defense has been
filed-an opinion by a medical practitioner of his choice, with as many
copies as there are copies of the statement of defense;
(3) apply to the court for the nomination of a medical expert.
Rule 172. The court may of its own motion nominate a medical expert at
any time, even before judgment has been given on the question of liability
for the damage, and this may be done on the application of a party, even
if the same party has submitted a medical opinion.
Rule 173. The medical expert will be nominated by the court from
the list of experts and so far as possible according to the order in which
they appear on the list; [the nomination shall not be abrogated for the
sole reason that his term of appointment under rule 167 has terminated
meanwhile.]
Rule 174. The medical expert nominated by the court may examine the
plaintiff; he may hear the opinion of a medical practitioner who has sub-
mitted an opinion on behalf of a party; and he is obliged to do so if so
requested by a party.
Rule 175. A medical expert may, at any time, apply to the court, in
writing or orally, for directions concerning the fulfillment of his duty, and
rule 303 shall not apply to an application in writing under this rule.
Rule 176. (a) The medical expert shall submit his report to the court
within thirty days of the day of his nomination by the court, unless the
court or registrar has made any other order.
(b) The opinion shall be submitted with as many copies as the court
shall order and the court shall serve them on the parties.
Rule 177. The court may order a medical expert to give the plaintiff a
further examination and to submit an additional opinion; it may also order
the plaintiff to undergo an additional examination by another medical expert.
Rule 178. The plaintiff may, within fifteen days of the date on which
the opinion of the medical expert was served upon him, rectify the sum
which he claimed in his statement of claim, whether by increasing or de-
creasing it, without obtaining leave from the court.
Similar proposals are abroad in the United States today.80
As in the case of several of the other reforms discussed above, a
slightly stronger case can be made for the adoption of this one in non-
jury cases, although I am certainly not against it for jury trials. A
judge is probably less likely than a jury to feel that he must rubber
stamp the expert's conclusion, although such rubber stamping is
preferable to having the jury overawed by an expert, or worst of all,
making an uneducated choice between conflicting experts.
IV.
This article has briefly examined a number of Israeli variations from
what an American lawyer thinks of as the ordinary course of litigious
procedure in a common law country. Some of these, such as the
80. ZEISEL, KALVEN, & BucHoLz, op. cit. supra note 72, ch. 11.
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proposal concerning court appointed experts, will have had a familiar
ring; others, the practice of episodic trials and the use of "reasoned
judgments," probably seem quite foreign.
The preliminary description of the Austrian system finds many
echoes in the Israeli provisions discussed, and this may lead the
reader to overestimate the civilian influence in Israel. In fact, Israel
is very much a common-law jurisdiction-if anything there is more
respect for traditional English ideas (in legal matters) than with us.
The rules and practices I have described are not a product of con-
scious importation of civil law ideas, but logical developments in a
common law, adversary system that is not blessed, or encumbered,
with a jury. If there are resemblances to Austrian procedure, it is
because both are modem attempts to reach the same goal of efficient
resolution of controversies. It would be mildly surprising if there
had not been any parallel invention.
The underlying contention throughout has been that Americans
should seriously consider devising distinct rules of procedure for
nonjury cases. If ever we should decide to do this, we could do much
worse than observe the Israeli scene.
APPENDIX A
A COMPLAINT IN AN AusTwAN CIVr. CASE*
Amenrecht beauftragt1
In the Circuit Court, Wels
Plaintiff: Marianne Stockhammer, a minor, Keuschen No. 99, St.
Leonhard, represented by her father Matthias Stockhammer, foreman,
Keuschen No. 99, St. Leonhard




*This and Appendix D are translations of documents from a real case, however names
of parties and places have been disguised.
1. A free translation would be 'legal aid requested." Under the Armenreclit, or
"poor litigants law," a person who is not able to bear the expense of litigation without
impairing his ability to provide the necessities of life for himself and family may be
exempted from all costs and fees (including his opponent's attorney's fees if the
action is unsuccessful) and provided with a lawyer and an advance to cover his own
disbursements. There is machinery to screen out frivolous claims and defenses and
a requirement that the poor party must make full or partial payment if his fortunes
improve. ZPO sees. 63-73
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Defendants: (1) Franz Mayrhofer, farm laborer, Keuschen No. 37,
St. Leonhard;
(2) Matthias Aigl, sawmill operator, Keuschen No. 12,
St. Leonhard,
concerning: S45, 166
and determination of future liability (Stipulated value S50,000)
comprising in all S95, 1662
COMPLAINT
(1) The first named defendant, on 16 March 1958, while in the
employ of the second defendant as driver of a horse drawn sled on
the logging road3 in Keuschen, in the village of St. Leonhard, caused
an accident wherein I suffered injuries which will be more particularly
described. In consequence, the first defendant has been sentenced,
by a judgment of the district court in Mondsee (U 76/58) and of the
circuit court in Wels (7 BI 167/58), under Criminal Code §335, to
74 days in jail, suspended for three years, and to pay the costs of the
criminal proceedings and of the execution of the sentence.
The accident happened because the first defendant, who by his own
admission was completely inexperienced as a teamster, was driving
without sleighbells and with too heavy a load, because he released
the brakes too soon and, in particular, failed to use the requisite
harness-for example, a crupper essential to braking. Because there
were no sleighbells, I noticed the sled too late so that I could not
escape and was run over and dragged along. The first defendant saw
me at a distance of 20 meters and dragged me under the sled for
10 meters. In spite of the braking effect of my body it required a
distance of 30 meters to stop. From this it is evident that the
equipment of the sled was extremely deficient, especially the absence
of a crupper.
Proof: The judgment (U 76/58) of the Mondsee district court.
Karoline Stockhaammer, housewife, Keuschen 99, as witness.
(2) In the accident I suffered a complete shattering of the left
forearm and a double fracture of the left upper arm. The artery in
the elbow was torn and in spite of an attempt to sew it together
the flow of blood could not be restored and an amputation three
fingerbreadths below the elbow had to be performed. The upper arm
was broken in two places and had to be wired. Further I suffered
a head wound and brain concussion. I underwent treatment at the
state hospital in Salzburg for a period of 32 days.
2. About $4000. =schilling=about $.04.
3. "Guterweg," literally "goods way" or "freight road." Probably it was a steep,




At this time I still suffer from an irritation of the amputation
scar, headaches associated with atmospheric changes, and depression.
Proof: The medical certificates of Dr. Emanuel J6rgner, dated 23
October 1958, and of Chief Surgeon Dr. Josef Hohenwailner,
dated 29 October 1958.
Dr. Emanuel Jsrgner, general practitioner in Mondsee, as
expert witness, Karoline Stockhammer as witness
(3) At the time of the accident the first defendant was working for
the second defendant, bringing down saw logs; the second defendant
had employed the first for this purpose. The incompetence of the
first defendant for this work is clearly established in the judgment of
the Mondsee district court (U 76/58) and also in that of the circuit
court at Wels (7 BI 167/68). During the main hearing before the
Mondsee district court the first defendant, on 13 May 1958, stated:
" I am not a teamster. I took the harness that was there and hitched
up the horse. The sled was loaded with about 1 meter of piling.
I had not driven horses before and was undertaking that kind of
work for the first time."
Thus the first defendant lacked the requisite knowledge for safe
management of a loaded horsedrawn sled and so was an incompetent
employee. Besides this, the second defendant is responsible for the
damages sustained because he let the first defendant do his job
with an inadequately equipped sled. As determined in the judgment
(U 76/58) of the Mondsee District Court, the harness included
neither sleighbells nor the crupper, indispensable to braking.
Proof: Judgment U 76/58 of the District Court, Mondsee
Karoline Stockhammer as witness
(4) As a result of the accident I suffered the following damages:
(a) charges for stay at state hospital in Salzburg for 32 days at
S5.20 ..... S166.40
Proof: Bill of 30 May 1958 and
Karoline Stockhammer as witness
(b) for the numerous injuries which finally required an amputa-
tion of my left forearm, I demand as compensation for the pain and
loss of physical well being the reasonable sum of ...S45,000.
Proof: Karoline Stockhammer, Dr. Emanuel J6rgner as expert witness
(c) by the loss of the left forearm I am 50% disabled for employ-
ment
Proof: written opinion of Chief Surgeon Dr. Josef Hohenwallner
Chief Surgeon Dr. J. Hohenwallner as expert witness
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(d) in order to prevent atrophy of the left arm, I must wear a
prosthetic device as soon as the healing of the amputation wound
permits. This will have to be replaced twice a year.
Proof: Statement of Dr. Emanuel J6rgner, of 16 November 1958
Dr. Emanuel Jbrgner, general practitioner in Mondsee as
expert witness.
(e) through the loss of my left forearm my chances of marriage are
much reduced if not completely destroyed. However the amount
of this loss cannot yet be determined. Therefore a determination at
the present time that I will be entitled to compensation in the future
for damages arising out of the accident is necessary to prevent such
claims from being barred by the passage of time.
Proof: Karoline and Matthias Stockhammer
(5) I have in vain demanded payment and acknowledgment of
future responsibility of the second named defendant and of his lia-
bility insurer and therefore request the following
judgment
I. The parties defendant, Franz Mayrhofer, farm laborer of
Keuschen No. 37, and Matthias Aigl, sawmill operator of Keuschen
No. 12, are liable, indivisibly, to pay the sum of S45,166 to the plain-
tiff Marianne Hinterberger, a minor, within 14 days or have execution
issue.
II. It is determined that the minor child, Marianne Stockhammer
is entitled to compensation from Franz Mayrhofer, farm laborer of
Keuschen No. 37 and Matthias Aigl, sawmill operator of Keuschen
No. 12 for her not yet ascertainable damages, resulting from her 50%
disability, diminished chances of marriage, and procuring of pros-
thetic devices, all traceable to the accident caused by the first de-
fendant Franz Mayrhofer on 16 March 1958 as driver of a horse
drawn sled on the logging road in Keuschen.
III. The defandants are also liable, indivisibly, to pay the costs of
this action within 14 days or have execution issue.
IV. I further request, in accordance with the proposal of the at-
tached Armenrechts certificate, approval for legal aid, since I am
not in position to pay for the conduct of this litigation either out of
savings or income.






These are some brief excerpts from the novel, Die Frau des Staats-
anwalts (The District Attorney's Wife), by Frank Richard, recently
serialized in REvuE., a German popular magazine or Illustrierte. Al-
though fictional, they serve to illustrate the rather informal practice
of interspersed questioning and argument followed in continental
courts and suggest the atmosphere of a German criminal trial. An
Austrian lawyer, while firmly dissociating himself from my auslin-
disch literary tastes, assures me that these scenes are quite true-to-
life and could occur in any Austrian court room.
In the story, Frau Liithe and her lover Hans Gregor, a much
younger man, are on trial for the murder of Herr Liithe. At the
hearing described in the first excerpt a witness, Michael Griindig, is
being questioned about a revolver that had been identified as the
murder weapon....
"Herr Griindig," said the president of the court, after the usual
formalities, "examine this weapon and tell us whether it was once
yours.
The bailiff took the revolver from the table and handed it to the
witness.
"I don't know whether it is mine or not," said the witness. "It looks
sort of like it."
"It is your revolver! The police have determined that you bought it
with a regular firearm permit. You stated that you needed it be-
cause you often came home late and lived in a tough neighborhood.
Now, when did you sell the revolver to Herr Gregor?"
[After some prodding, Griindig testified he had sold it sometime
in the spring and that he didn't know why Gregor wanted it. The
president then asked the state's attorney if he had any questions.
He answered simply that he was satisfied with the showing that the
murder weapon had belonged to Gregor. The president then turned
to Gregor's counsel .... ]
"Herr Dr. Tohr, have you any questions?"
"Not of the witness." Hans Gregor's defender rose. "But in this
connection I would like to put a few questions to my client-in the
presence of the witness." And-when he had been given permission
for this-"Herr Gregor-you bought the revolver then because you
lived in a lonely area?"
Hans Gregor stood up. "In the immediate vicinity of my apart-
ment a few people had been mugged lately."
"Exactly," said the lawyer. "An important circumstance, inci-
dentally, that we will prove to the court in due course. But for now,




"And when you went to see Frau Liithe."
"Then too."
"And when did you miss the weapon?"
An expression of resigned boredom settled on the state's attorney.
He knew from the preliminary investigation that Hans Gregor
claimed to have lost the revolver.
"About the first of July," said Hans Gregor.
"After a visit with Frau Liithe?"
Dr. Wanderer, Annemarie Liithe's defender, arose. This was always
a difficult feat as his enormous belly was jammed fast between the
table and defense counsel's bench.
"I must interrupt my Herr colleague," he thundered. "This question
has nothing to do with the witness Griindig and is just a futile at-
tempt to suggest to the court that my client took Herr Gregor's
weapon.
"I will come to Herr Griindig straightaway," replied Dr. Tohr
calmly. "I don't interrupt you when you question your client." He
turned to the president. "I must put a few rather painful questions
to my client which are unfortunately indispensable in the interest
of truth." Without waiting for the president to authorize this, he
continued his questioning "On the night you noticed your revolver
was gone, Herr Gregor.. . had you earlier been alone with Frau
Liithe?"
Gregor looked at his lawyer with loathing.
"Fraulein Liithe was not at home?" the lawyer continued im-
perturbably. "Her mother had sent her out?"
"Ja," answered Herr Gregor. His resigned "Ja" was that of a man
who would say Ja and Amen to anything in order to be left in peace-
"Were there intimacies between you and Frau Luthe that night?"
The state's attorney glanced at the president. Not for the first time
he felt that Dr. Diebold was not the judge for this case. If he wanted
to hear these details, why didn't he at least exclude the public?
He thought of Martha and was glad she had stayed home. Also, for a
moment, he felt a touch of sympathy for Frau Liithe, whose most
private affairs were being served up to the sensation-hungry public.
"Ja," answered Gregor unwillingly.
"You had"-now his lawyer hesitated too-"You had taken your
clothes off?"
The state's attorney glanced at Annemarie Liithe, who sat there, the




Now Dr. Tohr turned to the witness. "Just one question, Herr
Grijndig. Did Herr Gregor-in the period between the first and tenth
of July-speak to you about the loss of his revolver?"
"I can't remember the exact time," he answered. "One time he
said, 'I should have saved my money. The thing is gone.'
Franz Tohr sat down satisfiedly.
The state's attorney was already on his feet.
"I call to the court's attention that the only important thing here
is the exact time, which Herr Griindig can't remember. Several
weeks passed between the murder and Herr Gregor's arrest." He
continued sarcastically, "If Herr Gregor said, 'the "thing" is "gone','
the day after the crime then he was obviously telling the truth. We
know where it had gone. Hidden-after the crime."
[At another session, a week or so later, as the trial had been inter-
rupted to search for a missing witness, Carla Liithe, the defendant's
daughter, was questioned about a conversation with Hans Gregor on
the fatal night .... ]
"Hans Gregor knew nothing of the planned murder."
This time Martha felt that the audience did not believe the girl. If
Hans had said nothing to her about the murder, why wouldn't she
tell what he had confided in her that night?
"Did Hans Gregor tell you," the state's attorney asked, "that he
had come from Bad Homburg to Frankfurt with your mother?"
After a little hesitation, Carla answered this question in the
affirmative.
"Weren't you surprised that your mother hadn't come home?"
"He said she was going to go back to Bad Homburg."
Dr. Sand struck the table with his fist. "You contradict yourself
again! Earlier you told us you knew nothing of a return by Gregor to
Bad Homburg."
"I said that he said nothing to me about that," explained Carla
LUthe. "I mean, that he himself... But he said, my mother would
only be gone a few hours .... "
The state's attorney seemed not to hear her. He addressed the
jurors:
"Ladies and gentlemen-I ask you-what do you make of this story.
The witness tells us that she found nothing surprising . . ." He
began again. "Consider the situation. A woman interrupts her am-
orous weekend; goes to Frankfurt; returns; meets her lover again ...
and her daughter finds all this perfectly ordinary." He sat down.





These outlines will give an idea of the course of litigation in an
ordinary negligence case under three differing systems of procedure.
The cases are real ones chosen because they illustrate a wide range
of procedural steps. The dates give some notion of the compara-
tive pace of litigation but it would be unwise to draw any conclu-
sions on the basis of such a minute sample as no single case is ever
completely typical. For example, in the American case the com-
plaint was filed unusually soon after the accident probably in an
effort to get service on and take the deposition of an out-of-state
defendant; and I am told that in the Israeli case the period between
the close of arguments and rendering of judgment was two or three
times as long as usual because of the exceptional complexity of the
medical evidence. I am also told that an appeal to the Supreme Court
of Israel must be taken within 30 days of the district court judgment
and will ordinarily be finally disposed of within about six months
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A JUDGMENT OF AN AusTRiAN CoURT OF FIRST INSTAWCE
IN THE NAME OF. TE REPUBLIC!
The circuit court for Wels, through Oberlandesgerichter Dr. Johann
Schbnauer as judge, in the action brought by the plaintiff: Marianne
Stockhammer, a minor, Keuschen No, 99, St. Leonhard, represented
by her father Matthias Stockhammer, foreman, of Keuschen No. 99,
who is represented by Dr. Heinrich Thun, advocate of Salzburg,
against the defendants: D. Franz Mayrhofer, farm laborer of Keuschen
No. 37, St. Leonhard, and 2) Matthias Aigl, sawmill operator of
Keuschen No. 12, St. Leonhard, both represented by Dr. Hermann
Eiselberg, advocate of Wels, for S45,166. and determination of future
liability (stipulated value S50,000), has adjudged as follows:
The defendants are liable, indivisibly, to pay the sum of S30,166 to
the plaintiff within 14 days or have execution issue.
It is determined that the plaintiff is entitled to as yet unascertain-
able damages resulting from her 50% disability, diminished chances
of marriage and procuring of prosthetic devices, all traceable to the
accident caused by the first named defendant on 16 March 1958 as
driver of a horse drawn sled on the logging road in Keuschen.
The defendants are liable to pay the costs of the action, ascertained
as S8,724.80 to the plaintiff within 14 days or have execution issue.
The demand that the defendant be held indivisibly liable to the
plaintiff for damages for pain and suffering in the further sum of
S15,000 is refused.
Grounds for the decision:
On 16 March 1958 there was an accident on the Schober logging
road in Keuschen, St. Leonhard, in which the plaintiff (born 7- Jan-
uary 1954) was seriously injured. She was knocked down and
dragged along by a horse-sled which the first defendant was driving
in the employ of the second. As a result the first defendant, on 13
May 1958 in the Mondsee district court, was found guilty of en-
dangering life under §335 of the Criminal Code. Thus far the facts
are not in dispute.
The plaintiff prays for judgment . . . and alleges in support of
the prayer: (Here the judge summarizes the complaint set out in
Appendix A.)
The defendants take issue with the plaintiff both as to liability and
damages, and pray, for dismissal of the prayer for present damages
and determination of future responsibility. They do not contest the
amount of the bill incurred at the state hospital in Salzburg-S 166.
The first defendant claims-
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[Here the judge summarizes the answers. Mayrhofer alleged that Marianne
had scooted out of a side path on a sled immediately in front of him, so
close that he could not have stopped even with a crupper. He denied he
was going too fast or that the sled was overloaded. The absence of sleigh-
bells made no difference because everybody living along the road knew it
was in constant use. Aigl denied that Mayrhofer was inexperienced. He
alleged he reasonably believed him to be competent and had provided him
with adequate harness and other equipment and this was the extent of his
duty.]
Proof was taken by examination of witnesses Anna Essl, Josef Morti,
Josef Wessbaumer, Josef Schwaighofer, Katharina Hierner, Karoline
Mayrhofer and Johann Aigl, by hearing the experts Matthias Ram-
sauer and Dr. Hans Schattinger, by examination of both defendants
as parties, by a view of the scene of the accident, and by reading the
judgment of the Mondsee district court (U 76/58), the hospital
records pages 49-51, the medical certificates (Exhibits C-E) and the
bill of the Salzburg state hospital (Exhibit E). Based thereon are the
following findings of fact:
The second defendant has a farm and sawmill at Keuschen No. 12
in the village of St. Leonhard bei Mondsee. The first defendant comes
from a rural background and worked as a farm laborer until March
1959. From the age of 12 he had driven horse-sleds. Already at 13
he brought wood out of the forest alone by sled. He engaged in wood
transport by sled almost every winter, on the farm, and with the
second defendant for whom he often worked as a day laborer. One
winter he worked steadily for him. After his discharge from the
army in February 1958 he worked nearly everyday for the second
defendant mainly at wood-transport. He, together with the witness
Josef Schwaighofer, also employed by the second defendant, began
bringing down wood by the Schober road to the St. Leonhard road
five days before the accident. Each man used a one-horse sled. On
the day before the accident sawlogs were brought down from the
woods above houses No. 14 and 102 Keuschen. The drag of the
logs on the snow was such that the horses had to pull despite the
downgrade. On the last day, March 16th, piling rather than saw-
logs were transported. The loads were more than one cubic meter.
The accident happened about 3:30 P.M. about 12-15 meters north of
the Hierner house, Keuschen No. 14, on the logging road. This road
is about 2 meters wide. From its terminus at the St. Leonhard road
it runs first straight and somewhat uphill and in a southerly direction
past houses No. 12 and 102. These buildings are about 3 meters from
the logging road and 30 meters from one another. Passing these
houses-there are no others alongside the logging road-it has a grade
of 7 or 8%. Some 70 meters south of No. 102 the road curves to the
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right into the woods, and at this curve the grade increases to about
9.4%. Keuschen No. 99-the plaintiff's house-is on the St. Leonhard
road, west of the logging road....
Before the accident the child was with the witness Katharina Hier-
ner at No. 14. When she wanted to go home the witness went with her
to the front door which is on the south side of the house. From here
the view up the logging road toward the woods is blocked by No. 102.
From the door the child went down the path to the road on her sled
just as the first defendant came down the road. He had released the
sled's brake at the end of the curve when he came out of the woods
and had a clear view of the rest of his route. This increased his
speed and the horse broke into an easy trot. Eight or ten meters
above No. 14 he saw the plaintiff for the first time as she sledded
into the road. He could not see her sooner because of house No. 102
and the snowbanks bordering the road. He called to her to get out
of his way and also tried to stop by hauling on the reins, but coufd
not prevent the accident. The horse avoided her but she was caught
by the rear runners and seriously injured.
The first defendant had failed to harness up with sleigh bells and
a crupper, which would have made it easier to stop the sled. Under
the existing circumstances (easy trot, hard surface, one-horse sled
loaded with one cubic meter of piling) the first defendant needed
15-16 meters to stop the sled. If a crupper had been used a stop
within 5-6 meters would have been possible. (Report of expert
Matthias Ramsauer, p. 84).
The second defendant had repeatedly urged the first defendant
and also his other employees occupied in transporting wood, to
harness up with crupper and sleighbells. He had this gear available
in orderly condition, enough for six horses. The second defendant
had not given special instructions with regard to the harnessing of
the teams for the transport of wood over the Schober road and made
no special check thereon. He didn't consider this transport of wood
to be difficult and relied on the knowledge and experience of the
men doing the work. (Testimony of both defendants as parties.)
Johann Eisl who had worked for the second defendant for two and
a half years before New Year's 1958 as a stable boy had always used
sleighbells and a crupper when driving a sleigh. He was replaced by
Josef Nussbaumer, who had the job of stable boy for about four
weeks. The latter had not always used sleighbells; especially not
when he expected that, because of the condition of the road, no other
sleighs would be out. Josef Nussbaumer used a crupper when he con-
sidered such equipment necessary. (Testimony of the witnesses
Josef Nussbaumer, Johann Eisl and Josef Schwaighofer).
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In the transport of wood over the Schober road, neither the first
defendant nor the witness Josef Schwaighofer used either sleighbells
or cruppers, not on the day of the accident nor on numerous days
before. They considered both unnecessary. Also, on the other occasions
in February and March 1958, both had been seen driving horsesleds
without sleighbells and crupper. Josef Schwaighofer drove a sleigh
four or five times together with the first defendant. On these trips,
they never used sleighbells. (Testimony of the witnesses Johann
Eisl and Josef Schwaighofer, testimony of the first defendant as
party.)
The plaintiff suffered a complete crushing of the left forearm and
a spiral fracture of the left overarm. The left forearm had to be
amputated just below the left elbow. Since it was impossible to put
on a proper cast, the left upperarm could only be set by sewing with
wire all around. Both injuries were termed very serious. The plaintiff
further suffered a one-centimeter long lacerated wound on the parietal
bone with haemotoma in the area and a covered injury to the cere-
brum. These injuries are considered minor. The process of recovery
in hospital lasted 32 days and was without complication. After the
stay in the hospital, the plaintiff suffered a skin eruption and tic. The
removal of the medullary nail and the wiring made necessary another
shorter stay in hospital. The injuries of the plaintiff resulted in a week
of continued severe pain, 14 days of continual medium pain, and two
months of continual light pain. Following this, and till the end of
1959, she suffered minor pain, in the beginning frequently, later
sporadically-taken altogether this was the equivalent of two months
of continual light pain. A subsequent operation brought a day of
continual severe pain and three days of continual mild pain. At the
time of the examination of the defendant by a medical expert on
Oct. 5, 1959, the defendant still had phantom pains and a painful
scar on the left upper arm. According to the present legal annuity
table, a permanent decrease of 60% in earning capacity is to be
assumed with the loss of the left forearm. At this time, the stump of
the forearm is still unfavorable for the fitting of an artificial limb. In
the meantime, only a temporary artificial limb can be used. The
danger exists of further muscular atrophy in the left upper arm which
can be lessened by intensive physical therapy. In consideration of
the age of the defendant and her otherwise good health she will
presumably overcome the mental consequences of the injuries suf-
fered in the accident after a relatively short time. (Experts report,
medical history of case).
The details of the accident could be established from virtually
uncontradicted evidence. Any dispute merely involved the place of
the accident. According to the testimony of the witniess Josef
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Schwaighofer and that of the first defendant, she was found lying
not further than 5 meters from the house, Keuschen No. 4. According
to the testimony of the witnesses Katharina Hierner and Karoline
Stockhammer, she was 12 to 15 meters north of the house. As the
first defendant had seen the plantiff child only 8 to 10 meters before
the junction of the path from Number 14, and, as he testified, stopped
immediately after the accident, the location of the accident can be
fixed with certainty about at the place established by the witnesses
Hierner and Stockhammer. This is in consideration of the sleighs
stopping distance set by the expert Matthias Ramsauer at 15 to 16
meters and with regard to the necessary reaction time.
The ability of the first defendant and his experience in the transport
of wood by sled are established by the uniform and credible testimony
of the witnesses Anna Essel, Johann Eisl, Josef Schwaighofer and
Josef Nussbaumer, as well as the testimony of both defendants as
parties. It would also be very improbable if the first defendant,
coming from a farming family, growing up in the area of Mondsee,
and who, until recent times, was always employed as a farm worker,
did not know how to handle horse sleighs, with which the transport
of wood is chiefly carried out. The contrary records in the criminal
case U 76/58 of the BG. Mondsee must rest on a mistake. Credible, cor-
roborated testimony also establishes the availability of the prescribed
equipment for the teams used in the defendant's business. That the
second defendant had made a general order respecting the use of
sleighbells and cruppers was proved by the testimony of. the first
defendant which confirmed that of the second defendant. For the
transport in question, the second defendant, as he himself admitted,
had made no special order because he was of the opinion that he
could rely on his employees. The witnesses Josef Nussbaumer and
Josef Schwaighofer agreed that, despite the order of the first de-
fendant, they drove sleighs without sleighbells in the first months
of the year. The testimony of the witness Johann Eisl goes to prove
this with particular force.
By the judgment of the Mondsee district court of May 13 the first
defendant was found guilty because of the accident in question.
This is binding on the civil court. In the judgment, it was de-
termined that the first defendant was to blame for the accident
because he released the brakes, drove at a trot and used the sleigh
without sleighbells and crupper. The evidence,' received in the
present proceedings proves the same factors of guilt. The first de-
fendant consequently violated §56 par: 2 of the Traffic Code, accord-
ing to which audible bells must be used on harnesses of draught
animals. He failed to exercise the necessary caution when he re-
leased the braking chain on the downgrade, whereby the speed of
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the sleigh increased. The lack of a crupper then made it impossible
for him to stop the sled in a short distance when the emergency
arose. All these factors combined in the accident. In particular, the
bells ringing would have made the witness Katharina Hierner aware
of the approaching sleigh at the right time. In this case, she would
not have sent the child on her way alone. The bells ringing, too,
would have meant a warning even for the four-year-old child. That
the first defendant saw the road clear did not excuse him. He should
have realized that someone might come out on the road from the
Keuschen houses, numbers 14 and 102. He should have been even
more careful since the approach to Number 14, could not be seen.
Since an accident happened on the first trip of the day, his objection
that the inhabitants of the adjacent houses had knowledge of the
wood transport hardly has weight. The fault of the first defendant
is therefore sufficiently established and therewith his liability for
the plaintiff's claims.
The liability of the second defendant is based on §1315 of the
General Civil Code. In answer to this, contrary to the assertion of
the plaintiff party, it was clearly proved that the first defendant had
previously and frequently driven horse sleighs and transported wood.
It was further proved that the second defendant had not put in-
adequately equipped sleds at the disposal of his employees. An
employee's "incompetence," in the sense of the section cited, how-
ever, may also be found if an accident's occurrence is traceable to a
general propensity for negligence, to a lack of conscientiousness, and
repeated non-observance of safety regulations. The first defendant,
had not just displayed a gross lack of caution on one occasion but
had already driven without sleighbells on the days preceding the
accident in the months of February and March 1958 and therewith
made clear that he was not willing to obey the traffic code. For
safety in traffic a bellring is of vital necessity. In the case of the
first defendant, we can therefore speak of a propensity to disregard
this rule. The accident is therefore not to be attributed to a single
failure on the part of an otherwise capable servant but to an inclina-
tion towards negligence in the first defendant, to a lack of conscien-
tiousness. The negligence already existing before the accident, to-
gether with the first defendant's repeatedly displayed disregard of
the regulations about sleigh-traffic, were, in conclusion, intrinsic
joint causes of the accident on March 16, 1958. If one cannot con-
clude from the accident that there was a gross lack of ability or
training, from the past conduct of the first defendant as a driver of
horse sleighs one can find an "incompetence" in the exercise of this
occupation in the sense of the code section. Therefore, the liability
also falls on the second defendant, jointly with the first, for the
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results of the accident. It makes no difference whether or not this
incompetence was known to the second defendant. He cannot defend
himself by the fact that he had given the appropriate orders.
Nor may the defendants claim a reduction of damages under §1310
of the General Civil Code. According to this section how far a child
is responsible for her conduct depends on her age and mental develop-
ment. A child barely four years old has no appreciation of danger,
all the more if the child, as in the case of the plaintiff, is not made
aware of the threatening danger by any circumstance whatsoever.
The plantiff is therefore not to be considered accountable in the
sense of the law.
The objection of the defending parties that the mother of the child
bringing the action should have reckoned with the possibility of the
appearance of a sleigh and that she violated her duty of supervision,
needs no discussion. The fault of the mother can not be imputed to
the child. The conduct of the mother was perhaps a cause of the
accident, but this means only that the defendant may have some
claim over against her.
The plaintiff is entitled to damages for pain and suffering under
§1325 of the code. By these, all hardship which the injured child
suffered as a result of the injury, should be made good. The court
takes into consideration in fixing the amount, the above established
extent and duration of the pain, the nature of the injuries, the course
of recovery and, above all, the mental sufferings resulting from the
physical injury. The unhappiness of being a cripple and the feeling
of depression because of a permanent diminution of the ability to
work, are objects which are of particular importance in determining
the damages in the case in question. The court considers the entire
injury from the accident of the plaintiff appropriately compensated
by the sum of S30,000. The demand for a further S15,000 is therefore
refused.
The demanded sum of S166.40 for the expenses incurred during the
stay in the hospital is proven by the hospital bill (Exhibit B). The
plaintiff's prayer is therefore granted in the sum of S30.166.40. The
requisite legal interest for an establishment of future responsibility
is present. The alleged decrease in earning capacity is established by
the report of a medical expert. The loss of the left forearm can, if
the plaintiff goes to work, occasion a substantial loss of income. In
addition, decreased prospects of marriage are probable. As the
child grows, it will be neccesary to repeatedly replace her artificial
arm and this may occasion expense not forseeable today. For these
reasons the prayer for establishment of responsibility is granted.
Costs are awarded in accordance with §41 of the Civil Procedure
Law. No costs are allowed for the motion for an extension of time
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
(Document No. 20) or for the motion proposing proof (Document
No. 23). These motions could have been made at the oral hearing
which took place two days later.




INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN WRITING
1. The following provisions were added to the Israel Evidence
Ordinance in 1954.
PART VII-EVIDENCE OF EXPERTS
25. The court may, unless it fears that a miscarriage of justice may
result, receive in evidence, in writing, the opinion of an expert
as to a matter of science, research, art of professional knowledge
(hereinafter: "opinion') and a certificate or a physician as to the
state of health of a person (hereinafter: "medical certificate").
30. (a) The provisions of section 25 do not derogate from the power of
the court to order that an expert or a physician shall be examined
in court, and the court shall accede to the request of a party for
an order to such effect.
(b) Where it appears to the court that the request of a party for an
expert or a physician to be examined in court was vexatious or




in the matter between... and...
EXPERT'S OPINION
N am e of E xp ert ................................................................................................
A ddress and Place of W ork ............................................................................
I, the undersigned, have been requested by .. .to state my professional
opinion as to the question set out hereunder, which has arisen in the court
in the matter under reference. I give this opinion in lieu of testimony in
court and hereby declare that I am well aware that for the purpose of
criminal law concerning false testimony given on oath in court this opinion,
when signed by me, will be treated like testimony on oath in court.
Particulars of E ducation ..................................................................................
Particulars of Professional Experience ............................................................
O p inion ..............................................................................................................
D ate .................................................... Signature .......................
[ VOL. 19
NONJURY TRIALS
Foiu OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
N am e of Physician ...........................................................................................
Address and Place of W ork ........................................................................
N um ber of L icense ........................................................................................
I, the undersigned, hereby attest and certify that on . . . at . . . I
examined X. Y. and arrived at the following findings in regard to him ..
This certificate is given by me for submission to the court as evidence, and
I hereby declare that I am well aware that for the purpose of the provisions
of the criminal law concerning false testimony given on oath in court this
certificate, when signed by me, will be treated like testimony on oath in
court.
D ate ........................................ Signature .................................................... 1
2. A very similar part VIII, relating to proof of the contents of
official records, was added to the Evidence Ordinance in 1955.2
3. Another 1955 enactment, the Protection of Children Law, re-
quires the police and the courts to obtain permission from a "youth
interrogator," (i.e., a social worker) before questioning, or hearing
as a witness, a child under 14 in connection with offenses against
morality. The act presumably contemplates that such permission
ordinarily will be withheld and the child will be examined in private
by the youth interrogator, in which case:
§ 9. Evidence as to an offense against morality taken and recorded by a
youth interrogator and any minutes or report of an examination as to
such an offense prepared by a youth interrogator during or after the
examination, are admissible as evidence in. court.
§ 10. Where evidence as referred to in Section 9 has been submitted to
court, the accused or the prosecutor may require, and the judge may
order, that the youth interrogator, reexamine the child and ask him a
particular question; but the youth interrogator may refuse to ask all or
any questions so required if he is of the opinion that asking them is
likely to cause physical harm to the child.
§ 11. A person shall not be convicted on evidence under Section 9 unless
it is supported by other evidence.
3
4. A draft code of evidence prepared by the Harvard-Israel Project'
contains the following sections:
Section 25: Testimony Outside the jurisdiction.
The trial court may order that testimony that is to be heard at a place
outside its jurisdiction be presented before another court or before a special
examiner to be appointed for that purpose by the trial court, on such terms
1. 8 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 89, 90-91 (5714-1953/54).
2. 10 LAws OF T STATE OF ISRAEL 10. (5716-1955/56) ("admit as evidence a
certificate concerning a thing recorded in an official document").
3. 9 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 102, 104 (5715-1954/55).
4. See note 27 accompanying main text supra.
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as it may by order direct. Such testimony shall be considered as if it had
been given before the trial court.
Section 26: Power of Single Judge to Hear Testimony.
A court composed of three judges or more, may impose upon one of them
the duty of hearing testimony either generally or in a particular case or
of a particular witness; testimony given before such judge shall be con-
sidered as if it had been given before the full bench.
Section 45: Power of Single Judge to Inspect.
A court composed of three or more judges may impose upon one of its
members the duty of inspection; and inspection by such judge shall be
considered as if it had been an inspection by the full bench.
APPENDIX F
A JUDGMENT OF AN ISRAELI COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
In The Tel-Aviv District Court
Before Judge Dr. Y. Sussman
In the matter of:
The plaintiff: Yitzhak Rossi
V.
The defendants: 1. David Anschlovman
2. Tel-Aviv Municipality
judgment
At 2 p.m. on 18 December 1950 the plaintiff, a 31-year-old man,
was riding a motorcycle along Pinsker Street in Tel-Aviv, towards
Mugrabi Square. As he was approaching the junction of Droynov
Street and Pinsker Street, the plaintiff received a sudden blow and
as a result of the impact he was thrown from his motorcycle and fell
a distance of 1-132 metres onto the ground. As a result of his fall, the
plaintiff fractured his left thigh in two places, as described by the
doctor who treated him, Dr. Stavorowsky, exhibit P/12.
The plaintiff was hospitalized a number of times in the Tel-Aviv
Municipal Hospital, "Hadassah," and his leg was placed in a plaster
cast. After treatment which continued about six months the fractures
have healed, but the plaintiff limps and his damaged leg is 3 cms.
shorter than his right leg, necessitating the use of a special orthopaedic
shoe in order that both legs should be of equal length.
2. We could not ascertain from the plaintiff's words who was
the man or what was the object which dealt him the blow, but the
plaintiff and two other men, Assigman and Nachmias, have given
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evidence that at the time of the accident there passed by the
plaintiff a jeep driven by the first defendant. This vehicle did not
stop immediately after the accident owing, it seems, to the fact
that its driver, the first defendant, did not perceive what was hap-
pening, but the cries of passers-by caused him to come to a halt about
15 metres from the location of the accident.
3. It will be noticed that, although the accident took place whilst
the jeep was overtaking the motorcycle, no one testified that the jeep
struck the motorcycle or its rider, or that it was the jeep which
dealt the plaintiff the blow which knocked him over.
The question that arises from these facts is-and I confess that I did
not find it an easy one to resolve-whether there is anything in the
very fact that the accident took place which can constitute proof
that the defendant's negligent driving was the cause of the accident.
This is not a question of fact, for we have not yet arrived at the
stage where I must express an opinion as to whether or not I believe
that the plaintiff fell as a result of the encounter; we are dealing
with a question of law, viz., whether the testimony of the witnesses
discloses any evidentiary material which can provide the basis for
such an opinion. In other words: if the proceedings were to take
place before a judge sitting with a jury, could the judge direct the
jury to decide, on the basis of the evidence, whether the accident
was caused by the first defendant, or would it be the judge's duty
to dismiss the claim since the plaintiff had not submitted any
evidence to be put before the jury?
The difficulty of solving this problem may be shown by a compari-
son of two precedents: Wakelin v. London & South Western Rail-
way ((1882) 55 L.T. 709) on the one hand, and Jones v. Great
Western Railway ((1931) 144 L.T. 194) on the other.
In the first case a man was found dead beside a level crossing
which had been left open at the time of the accident (about 9 o'clock
-see the account of the facts on page 709, ibid.); and it was proved
that a train had passed through without giving a warning sign,
and that after 8 o'clock the railway guard no longer worked by the
crossing. It was held, however, that these facts did not constitute
proof that the defendants had been negligent and that their negli-
gence had caused the accident, the reason being that no explanation
was provided of how the man came to be on the railway tracks.
In Jones' case a man was found killed, lying between the wagons
of a train standing in the station. The cause of death was not
ascertained, but it was established that railway workmen had been
shunting the wagons and the company was held liable, since it did
not prove that its workmen had given a warning. The Lord Chancel-
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lor, Lord Hailsham (ibid, at page 196) struggled to make a distinc-
tion between the two cases; moreover, during the course of these
exertions he said, mistakenly, that it was not proved in Wakelin's
case whether the deceased man was killed before or after 8 o'clock,
while in the account of the facts in Wakelin's case the time of the ac-
cident was fixed at 9 o'clock in the evening, i.e., when there was no
longer a watchman at the level crossing.
It would seem, however, that in Wakelin's case judgment was
given in the company's favour not because of its lack of negligence,
but owing to the doubt as to whether its negligence was the cause
of the accident.
This is not the problem which arises in the present case. The
question here is not whether the first defendant's negligence caused
the accident (for there is no doubt that, if the first defendant's ve-
hicle did strike the plaintiff he was negligent, and that this was the
blow which knocked the plantiff over); the question here is whether
the first defendant struck the plaintiff at all while he was overtaking
him. When may evidentiary material be considered proof of the
defendant's negligence, and when not?
The answer to this question, although we are concerned with a
legal matter, is in fact provided by logic. When evidence is sub-
mitted to the court and is offered by one of the parties as the grounds
for a conclusion which he wishes the court to draw, it may be that
the entire evidence directs the court to the same conclusion, it may
be that it does not direct it at all to that conclusion, but it may
also be equivocal, that is to say that the conclusion sought may be
a plausible one without being a necessary one. In this third class
of case-with which we are here concerned-it is the judge's duty
to weigh up the possibilities; and the only way in which he can do
this is by the light of human experience and by asking himself:
"In view of what has taken place, does the outcome indicate negli-
gence on the part of the defendant, or is it equally consistent with
the possibility that he was not negligent?"
In the second case, where the possibilities are evenly balanced, the
evidentiary material loses its probative value for the purposes of at-
taching blame to the defendant, since if it is equally possible that
the defendant is or is not to blame it would be repugnant to see
him as guilty, and he is presumed to be innocent. In the first case,
on the other hand, when the evidentiary material indeed gives rise
to the possible conclusion that the defendant was not guilty of
negligence, but this conclusion is no nearer the truth than the alterna-
tive conclusion which indicates negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, the more certain of the solutions is to be preferred, and
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it is this preference which sanctions the evidence for the purposes
of proving the negligence.
Let us now return to the matter in hand. Counsel for the defend-
ants places emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff himself did not
see the encounter; he did not testify that the jeep struck him, but
used the following words: "Suddenly I received a blow and I fell."
Now we know that at that same moment the jeep overtook the
plaintiff. Let us suppose a man were knifed or struck from behind:
it would be impossible for him to see the man who stabbed him
or who dealt the blow, but if immediately afterwards there should
appear beside him another man, Y, is not X entitled to conclude and
to state that Y was the man who struck him? And it will not be
said that X is lying because he could not see Y at the time when the
blow was struck, since the objective situation supports his view
and provides a foundation on which to base his conclusion.
It seems to me that the situation here is similar. One of the witnes-
ses testified that the plaintiff was travelling slowly and that he rode
the motorcycle at a slow rate "with a tendency to wobble." How-
ever insofar as the possibility that the plaintiff fell from the motor-
cycle as a result of such a tendency exists at all, it does not measure
up against the alternative that he was thrown from his motorcycle
as a result of an impact; for that the second alternative merits
decisive preference is evident from the fact that the plaintiff came
off the motorcycle with a jerk which precipitated him over a distance
of a meter or more. From this I infer that the plaintiff did not simply
fall, but that he was brought down by a force stronger than himself;
and consequently I am of the opinion that the facts which are
known to us constitute admissible evidence that the motorcycle was
hit by the vehicle which was overtaking it.
3. In the light of the fact that we are entitled to conclude that
the first defendant knocked the plaintiff down, the question arises
whether we would be right in reaching this conclusion?
Here counsel for the defendants points out the important fact
that plaintiff fell on his left side, and the motorcycle, also, continued
towards the left after the accident, until the witness Nachmias went
up to it and turned off the engine.
The defendant overtook on the same side (the left), and if he
struck the motorcycle on this side (and it must be added that if he
struck it at all he must have struck the rear part of the motorcycle,
for otherwise the plaintiff would have seen it happen), while travel-
ling like a vehicle does when overtaking, that is to say, moving ahead
alongside the motorcycle, possibly with a leftward deviation, would
1965 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
not the impact of the collision have given the motorcycle a right-
ward direction?
The parties to the action for some reason did not find it necessary
to bring any expert evidence to explain the accident and insofar as
the laws of physics are a common heritage and do not require evi-
dence, I agree that the change in direction undergone by the motor-
cycle, according to the law of parallel forces, seems to be evidence
of a blow from the right, i.e. not from the side on which the plaintiff
was overtaken. However as against this I am taking into account the
following factors:
First, that the jeep was travelling at least twice as fast as the
motorcycle, and its weight exceeded that of the motorcycle; these
two factors might well have altered the direction taken by the latter.
Secondly, the motorcycle is a vehicle of which many of the parts
protrude, many as for instance its engine, its electrical system, and its
parking stand; this applies, moreover, to the driver himself. Should
the motorcycle or driver receive a blow from the left by a vehicle
overtaking them, it is quite possible for the vehicle to 'drag' him
along, if only for a second, and thereby alter his direction.
Here it must be pointed out that at the time the jeep was over-
taking it was describing an arc until it returned to its original path.
In contesting this fact the defendants rely on the evidence of Assig-
man, who gave evidence that the two vehicles were travelling parallel
to one another. On this question, however, I prefer the evidence of
the witness Nachmias: first, because he was in a better position to
see than Assigman, since the two vehicles were travelling towards
him whereas Assigman was parked by the side, and secondly, because
Assigman himself agrees that the jeep eventually braked and drew
into the kerb on the right, and this amounts to drawing an arc.
The first defendant elected not to give evidence and we have con-
sequently heard no explanation from him as to how the accident
took place. He was travelling behind the plaintiff and he is in a
position to offer an explanation, whereas the plaintiff cannot do so.
Had the first defendant entered the witness box and stated that he
had not struck the plaintiff, I might have taken the' view that such
evidence negatived the probative value that I attribute to the ob-
jective situation and might have magnified the doubt to such an
extent that I should no longer be prepared to find as a fact that it
was he who had caused the accident. The defendant, however, did
not give evidence; there was no other force near the location of the
accident which could have thrown the plaintiff from his motorcycle,
and consequently I prefer to draw the conclusion that the first de-
fendant, when he was overtaking the plaintiff, drove his jeep in such
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a way that in drawing the arc the back part (so it seems) of the jeep
struck the rear end of the motorcycle and the plaintiff fell on his left
side behind the overtaking vehicle; thus the vehicle succeeded in
passing without running over the plaintiff.
4. What was the damage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
the negligence?
Firstly, the plaintiff claims his medical expenses to the sum of
IL 360.-.1 Receipts as to a part of this sum were submitted, the details
of which were not clarified by the plaintiff's evidence, but the defense
attorney hinted that he was refraining from examining on this ques-
tion and that he had no intention of refuting these particular expenses.
Secondly, the plaintiff claims IL 900.- loss of income over a period
of 6 months. The plaintiff is, it appears, a partner in a carpentry
works. Every week he would draw the sum of between twenty and
twenty-five pounds from the funds of the business, besides which
the partners would share out money from time to time, when there
was a cash balance to their credit. However, even if we accept that
the plaintiff's share of the profits of the enterprise totalled IL 150.-
per month, we must take into account that its activities were not
entirely suspended by the accident; for the machines were hired out
to other carpenters who paid rental fees for their use, and the plaintiff
is entitled only to the sum which his own personal labours would
have brought him. In view of the meagerness of the evidence by the
plaintiff-we do not know how long the partnership has been in
existence or how much time the plaintiff devoted to his work before
he was injured-I estimate the plaintiff's loss of earnings to be IL 75.-,
that is to say IL 450.- over the period of six months.
The plaintiff further claims the sum of IL 400.- for future medical
treatment, but I reject this claim since I am convinced neither of
the need for this treatment nor of the expenditure which it involves.
There remains the claim for general damages. There is no doubt
that the plaintiff suffered pain and discomfort and was confined to his
bed for a lengthy period of time. His injured leg is shorter than the
other one, but here again we are ignorant and the doctor who treated
the plaintiff, Dr. Stavorowsky, was not questioned as to his chances
of recovery and improvement in the future. Without any expert
medical guidance I am not prepared to consider these factors as an
adequate basis for a judgment to the sum of IL 4.000. which the
plaintiff claims, and I shall fix the amount of general damages at
IL 1.000.
It has not been disputed that the first plaintiff was driving the
1. About $120.00. IL=Israei pound=about $ .33.
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vehicle in question while he was in the service of the second de-
fendant and in the course of his employment; consequently the second
defendant too is liable, under section 12 of the Civil Wrong Ordi-
nance, 1944.
The defendants are jointly liable to pay the plaintiff the sum of
IL 1.810.- plus 9% interest as from today.
Seeing as the plaintiff has been only partially successful in his
claim, I shall make no order as to costs.
judgment delivered in public in the presence of advocates Barak
and Hendelsman today, Dec. 12, 1951.
NONJURY TRIALS
APPENDIX G
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL
Three times each week for the past ten years, the Jerusalem Post,
an English language newspaper published in Jerusalem, has printed
summaries of significant and interesting opinion of the Israeli court. A
sampling of these is collected here in an effort to give a suggestion
of the flavor of Israeli legal methods and institutions.
Four of the opinions are referred to in the text or footnotes of my
article. The fifth, Malcha v. Attorney General, is included because
it deals with an important and troublesome point of tort law, liability
for unforseen consequences, and is especially suggestive of the legal
kinship of Israel with other common law jurisdictions.
Bear in mind that these are condensations and summaries rather
than strict translations. They were written by Doris Lankin, a mem-
ber of the Jerusalem bar, and I am told that they are considered by
Mrs. Lankin's colleagues, and indeed by the authors of the opinions
themselves, to be a very fair and accurate representation of the
courts' work.
Readers interested in more intensive study of Israeli jurisprudence
are referred to the Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of
Israel, a recently inaugurated series of reports containing full English
translations of selected Israeli opinions. These reports are published
in the United States by Oceana Publications, Inc. The first two
volumes were the subject of an extended "Book Report": Laufer,
Israel's Supreme Court: The First Decade, 17 f. LEG. ED. 43 (1964).
The permission of the Jerusalem Post to reprint the following
opinions is gratefully acknowledged.
JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE NOT ADMISSIBLE As EVmENCE
Tennenholz v. Poplikitz
The first appellant, while driving a lorry owned by the Shelev
company, the second appellants, collided with the respondent, who
was riding a motor-cycle, near Citrus House in Tel Aviv. The ap-
pellants were ordered by the District Court to pay the respondent
IL.1,701 damages. They appealed to the Supreme Court against this
decision, while Poplikitz counter-appealed against the amount of
damages awarded.
Judgment
Justice Sussman, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court,
after analysing the circumstances of the case, held that the District
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Court had not erred in concluding that the accident had been due
to the first appellant's negligence.
In considering M. Kritzman's complaint that the District Court had
accepted as evidence the fact that Tennenholz had been convicted
on a criminal charge in connection with the same accident, Justice
Sussman pointed out that the Supreme Court had already held (in
C.A. 102/47-Psakim B/63) that a judgment delivered in a criminal
case between the Attorney General and the accused could not be
used as evidence in a civil case brought by someone who was not a
party to the criminal case. The fact that in that case the accused
had been acquitted, whereas in the present case he had been found
guilty, made, in the opinion of the Justice, no difference in so far as
the principle was concerned.
If it were contended that the judgment in the criminal case should
at least be regarded as prima facie evidence of the accused's negli-
gence, then this contention, too, must be dismissed, the Justice held,
since the factual findings of the judge in the criminal case-based on
evidence which he had heard and seen-must be regarded by the
judge in the civil case as hearsay evidence, and thus not admissible.
In the civil case the judge must base his decision on the evidence
produced by both parties before him on the conclusions which he
himself draws, not relying on the conclusions of another, be he
even another judge (Hollington v. Hawthorn, 1943, 2 A.E.R. 35).
Justice Sussman emphasized that the Court was well aware of
the fact that there was a substantial difference between an acquittal
and a conviction in the criminal case. It was quite clear that an
acquittal in a criminal case would not stop the plaintiff from filing
a civil suit against the defendant since, in the criminal case, he had
not appeared as a party and could not plead his cause. The question
would be asked, therefore, why conviction should not be used against
the defendant who had been given every opportunity of pleading
his case in the criminal court. The answer to this question, continued
Justice Sussman, lay in the differences between the demands of
criminal law and that of civil law on the matter of evidence: while
criminal law allowed for a conviction on the uncorroborated evidence
of one person, civil law demanded corroboration.
The judgment in a criminal case was therefore inadmissible as
evidence in a civil case. But, Justice Sussman held, as the District
Court judge had not based his decision in the civil case on the judg-
ment in the criminal case, therefore the Supreme Court considered
that the hearing of the inadmissible evidence could not invalidate
the judgment.
In dealing with the amount of compensation granted by the District
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Court, Justice Sussman held that the lower court had erred in esti-
mating the damages accruing to the respondent up to the time of the
filing of the claim. It had been laid down by the Supreme Court
that damages of this nature must be proved by the plaintiff, and if
no satisfactory proof were forthcoming the judge was not entitled to
estimate these damages but had to dismiss the claim. Since the
respondent had not proved the amount of damage suffered by him
until his filing of the claim, therefore, Justice Sussman held, an
amount of IL. 126 must be deducted from the total award.
The Court dismissed the respondent's counter-claim for increased
damages on the grounds that while no denial was necessary from the
defendant as to the amount of damages claimed, nor of any allega-
tion in connection with damages (Rules 87 and 115 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure) the plaintiff, on the other hand, must prove his every
claim.
Judgment given on December 17,1954.
CRoss EXAMNATION BY JUDGES
Moshe Green v. The Attorney General
The Supreme Court allowed an appeal against a verdict of the
Haifa District Court, delivered on June 26, 1955 (Cr. C. 80/54)
which found the appellant guilty of unintentionally causing the death
of a child by want of precaution not amounting to criminal negli-
gence; he was fined IL200 and given nine months' suspended
sentence.
One day in 1953 a group of small children were playing on the
appellant's stationary ice van. After delivering the ice in the neigh-
borhood, Green moved his van further. When the van started moving,
one of the children-five-year old Ramsi Ben Naim-fell beneath it,
his skull being crushed by one of the back-wheels. When Green
was brought to trial in the Haifa District Court two years later on a
charge of having caused the child's death through carelessness (Sec-
tion 218 of the Criminal Code Ordinance) there were only two
witnesses: Leila, the dead boy's eight-year old sister, and Nuri, his
16-year old brother. When Leila was questioned by the prosecuting
council, she stated that her brother had been run over by the ice van
but that she was unable to explain how the accident had happened
since she had not seen where Ramsi was sitting and had not been
watching when he was run over. The defense counsel chose not to
cross-examine her, and Judge Khassan then put several questions to
her. In reply to these questions Leila told an entirely different story.
She related how she had seen her brother sitting on the back step of
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the van, and how he had rolled off when the van started moving
and thus fallen under the wheel and been crushed to death.
Nuri testified to having seen three children sitting on the step of
the van, two of whom jumped off when the van started moving and
third of whom fell.
In his judgment Judge Khassan found, on the strength of Leila's
evidence as corroborated by Nuri, that Ramsi had been killed when
he fell off the step of the ice van on which he had been sitting as the
van moved off. In explanation of the contradictory evidence given
by Leila he put forward the theory that she had actually been sitting
on the step with her little brother but had been afraid of admitting
this lest she should be punished by her parents for not taking sufficient
care of him. He therefore found Green guilty of causing the boy's
death through carelessness.
Mr. Tsherniak appeared for the appellant, Mr. Bach, Assistant to
the State Attorney, for the respondent.
judgment
Justice Cheshin, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court,
discussed at the outset the admissibility of evidence of a witness who
contradicts himself, pointing out that it had already been held in
Cr.A. 228/54 (P.D. 9/718) that contradictory evidence could not
be used as a basis for any factual finding. In the same judgment,
however, it had been held further that discrepancies might possibly
lend themselves to some satisfactory explanation. What possible
explanation could there be for the contradictory evidence given by
the girl? The theory propounded by Judge Khassan was untenable
for two reasons (on which Justice Chesin expounded in detail) and
it would seem that the real reason was to be found in the way the
judge had questioned her.
Both counsel had admitted that the judge had put leading ques-
tions to the girl, but Mr. Bach maintained that this was permissible,
relying on English precedents and authorities for this viewpoint.
While this was indeed so, continued Justice Cheshin, nevertheless a
certain measure of restraint and proportion should be preserved. It
is permissible for a judge to question a witness on controversial issues
in order to throw further light on any point-both for his own sake
and that of the opposing counsel; but the judge must confine himself
to putting his questions objectively and must not noticeably appear
to be taking sides. It was very likely-as argued by Mr. Bach-that
in the case of a young timorous child who has to be coaxed into
giving evidence by soft words and a soothing touch, the approach
should be entirely different from that towards an adult witness. But
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in that case the District Court judge might justifiably have taken the
child's evidence himself, from beginning to end. It was very possible
that the Supreme Court would have taken. no exception to such
procedure. However, this had not been done. Only after the
prosecuting counsel had questioned the witness and had not suc-
ceeded in obtaining any evidence, on which the accused could have
been convicted, and only after the defense counsel had refrained from
cross-examining, had the judge taken the initiative and by his
questioning succeeded in extracting incriminating evidence against
the accused. In other words he had thrown the full measure of his
weight on, the side of the prosecution.
Since, without the assistance of the judge, there would have been
no evidence on which to convict the accused, this irregularity in
procedure could not be overlooked. On the contrary, it emphasized
the unreliability of the evidence given by the girl. As to the corrobo-
rative evidence of Nuri, the facts showed that he had carried his
little brother to the hospital after the accident and had summoned
the police, but nevertheless had not told anyone-not the police or
his parents-that he had been a witness of the accident. His explana-
tion that he had not wished to give his parents any further pain
is specious. Therefore, his corroborative evidence, given for the first
time in the District Court, was not acceptable.
Appeal allowed on December 12, reasoned judgment given on
December 27, 1955.
WRONGDOER lESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES
Malcha v. The Attorney General
On September 1, 1953, David Malcha, who was driving a tender,
knocked down a two-year-old boy. The accident was held to have
been caused by negligent driving on his part. The boy suffered an
internal fracture of his arm, without any skin abrasions. In the cir-
cumstances, the doctors who treated him decided against giving him
anti-tetanus injection. After a few days a suppurating infection ap-
peared in the region of the fracture. The child's doctors still did not
consider it necessary to give him an anti-tetanus injection, because,
presumably, they considered that as some time had elapsed since
the child's body had been in contact with the ground, and during that
time there had been no open wound, there was no likelihood of his
having been infected with tetanus. Nevertheless, eight days after the
accident, the child developed tetanus and died.
Malcha was charged in the Haifa District Court with having by
want of precaution or by carelessness, not amounting to culpable
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negligence (Section 218 of the Criminal Code Ordinance), uninten-
tionally caused the death of the child. Judge Winogradoff, basing her
verdict on the English leading case (In re Polemis, 1921, 3 K.B. 560)
held that despite the unusual circumstances there had been a direct
causal connection between the death of the child and the accused's
negligent driving, the question as to whether the accused's negligent
driving had been foreseeable or not being immaterial, and found the
accused guilty. He was fined IL75.
Judgment
Justice Silberg delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court;
Justices Goitein and Berinson concurring. After discussing the ques-
tion of remoteness of damage in general, he gave a detailed analysis
of the Polemis case, with reference to legal authorities and com-
mentaries, comparing it with the Talmudic parallel of the money
placed in a cot of bulrushes. He then summed up the decision in
the Polemis case as being exactly equivalent to that in the Talmudic
case: a negligent beginning, an accidental result, he is liable (t'hilato
befshiya vesofo be'ones-hayav), as long as the accidental result is
directly derived from the negligence. In other words, a wrongdoer
is responsible for all the consequences arising from his wrongful act-
whether they were foreseeable and possible of contemplation, or not.
If this principle were applied to the case under consideration, said
Justice Silberg, then the appellant would be guilty of the offence
ascribed to him, since there had been a negligent beginning-his
careless driving which had led to his knocking down of the child;
the result had been accidental-the unfortunate mischance of the
child's having contracted tetanus, which even the medical experts did
not foresee; and the accidental result was directly derived from the
negligence, as the child would not have contracted tetanus if his
arm had not been injured during the collision.
The next question to be decided, therefore, was whether this
principle is applicable. In order to decide this, three preliminary
points would have to be considered: whether the rule laid down
in the Polemis case is the accepted rule in England; whether it is
also binding on the courts of Israel; and, thirdly, whether this rule,
mutatis mutandis, is applicable to an offence under section 218 of
the Criminal Code Ordinance.
English Doctrine
As to the first point, Justice Silberg held that, although the rule
had not been sanctified by the House of Lords, and although it had
been subjected to criticism, it must nevertheless be regarded as the
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guiding principle in English courts of law. In considering the second
point he first discussed in detail the various theories with regard to
the applicability of the Polemis judgment to cases in tort and in
contract; he then compared the decision in that case with that in
an earlier English case (Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 E.R. 145) in which
Alderson, B. had held that where a party to the contract breaks the
contract then "the damages which the other party ought to receive
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be considered . . . arising naturally, i.e. according
to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself."
There is no doubt, Justice Silberg concluded, that the test in
Hadley v. Baxendale, suitably adapted to cases in tort, differs from
that in the Polemis case. The former test could be summed up as one
of "foreseeability." But as foreseeability is also a condition precedent
to negligence, it is an essential element also in the rule in the
Polemis case. The only difference between the two rules is, therefore,
that, in accordance with Hadley v. Baxendale, the foreseeability
applies not only to the possibility of any damage occurring but also
to the kind of damage which might possibly occur.
If thus the responsibility of the appellant in the present case were
considered, mutatis mutandis, in the light of the test applied in
Hadley v. Baxendale, he would obviously be acquitted, as he could
not possibly have foreseen the kind of fatal consequence which arose
from his initial wrong act.
Test in Civil Wrong Cases
The final point to be considered, therefore, said Justice Silberg, is
what test of responsibility should be applied to a person accused of an
offense under section 218 of the Criminal Code: is the extent of his
responsibility equal to, or different from, that of a wrongdoer in a
civil wrongs case; and if it is equal, what principle should be used
in deciding the extent of a civil wrongdoer's responsibility.
As to the comparative extent of responsibility, it had already been
held (in Cr. A. 35/52) that a person would not be convicted of an
offence under section 218 unless he failed in his duty to take care
towards the victim to the extent that in a civil case damages would be
awarded against him. In other words, the extent of responsibility
equalled that of a wrongdoer in a civil wrongs case. And as to the
principle to be applied in deciding what is the extent of responsibility,
this could be gathered from a comparison of section 60(a) of the
Civil Wrongs Ordinance with the principle laid down in Hadley v.
Baxendale. This section states that "where the plaintiff has suffered
damage, compensation shall only be awarded in respect of such
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damage as would naturally arise in the usual course of things and
which directly arose from the defendant's civil wrong"-a rule prac-
tically identical with that laid down, mutatis mutandis, by Alder-
son, B. with regard to a tortious delict.
The conclusion to be drawn from this, said Justice Silberg, is that
the Mandatory legislature had adopted the rule in Hadley v. Baxen-
dale in preference to that laid down in the Polemis case-a preference
which was in no way to be regretted. The rule to be applied in
the case under consideration was therefor that of the foreseeability of
the kind of damage likely to result from an initial wrong act. In
applying this rule, the appellant must be acquitted.
Appeal allowed and sentence quashed.
Judgment given on October 24, 1956.
HIGH DEGREE OF CORROBORATION REQUIRED WHEN
CI.D'S EVIDENCE TAKEN BY YOUTH INTERROGATOR
Yehudai v. The Attorney General
The appellant, David Yehudai, was sentenced by District Court
Judge Gaulan to three years' imprisonment for having unlawful sexual
intercourse with a girl of 12. The main evidence against the accused
had been that of the girl herself which had been taken by a youth
interrogator out of Court, in accordance with the provisions of the
Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law.
The girl had told the youth interrogator that Yehudai and a man
by the name of Kriof had taken her to the former's hotel room and
had had sexual intercourse with her one after the other against her
will and by use of force.
Yehudai had admitted that he and Kriof had brought the girl to
his room and that Kriof had committed an indecent act upon her
person. He admitted too that he had intended having intercourse
with the girl but when he saw how young she was, had had a pang
of conscience and changed his mind. He had then demanded the
return of his money from Kriof who had given part of it back to
him.
Judge Gaulan found support of the girl's evidence in Yehudai's
admission that he had taken the girl to his room and in the fact that
he had refused to make any statement to the police immediately
after he had been apprehended.
In the appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant appeared on





Justice Landau, who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court
Justices Sussman and Berinson concurring, said that in his opinion
there had been insufficient grounds for convicting the appellant on
the basis of the evidence of the girl, or on the basis of his own
evidence or of both testimonies together.
The Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law of 1955, he
explained, introduced an innovation into the laws of evidence in that
the legislator, concerned for the spiritual health of a child who had
been involved in an offence against morality, had precluded any
possibility of that child's being caused any further mental harm
through having to give testimony in court.
But, he continued, it should not be presumed that the legislator,
in his anxiety for the health of the child, had wished in any way to
detract from those basic guarantees of an accused person's rights
which are characteristic of our criminal procedure. And yet the
child's evidence is delivered at second hand, which deprives the
judge of the opportunity of deciding for himself the witness' credi-
bility and deprives the accused of the opportunity of cross-examining
him. In compensation, therefore, the legislator laid down, in Section
11 of the law, that no person should be convicted on the evidence
of a child given through the medium of a youth interrogator, unless
that evidence is supported by other evidence.
The corroboration necessary, Justice Landau continued, is, because
of the peculiar characteristics of evidence given through the medium
of a youth interrogator, considerably more than mere "technical"
corroboration. No judge could possibly be fully persuaded of a
witness' veracity when he has not seen or heard the witness and
must thus exercise the greater care before giving such evidence any
weight.
This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that in sexual
crimes the courts will not convict a person on the sole evidence of
the complainant, even when that evidence is given in Court, let alone
when it is given second hand. In view of the way in which the
child's evidence is presented to the court, therefore, continued Justice
Landau, the court must be doubly conscientious in examining the
corroboratory evidence produced by the prosecution,
Girl Suspected
In the present case, Justice Landau held, from the evidence before
the court, there were grounds for the regretable and painful suspicion
that the girl, despite her tender age, had been a professional prosti-
tute. There had, therefore, been no sufficient cause for the District
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Court to make a positive evaluation of her veracity. And as to the
corroboration which the District Court had found in the appellant's
evidence, there was no confirmation in it of those important facts
which he had categorically denied.
Nor should the fact that the appellant had refused to make a state-
ment to the police be given exaggerated weight and no conclusion
should in any case be drawn from it unless the prosecution had
produced some prima facie evidence against the accused (see Cr.A.
139/52, P.D. 7/619). In the present case, the appellant's silence
could be reconciled with his innocence of the offence of rape and
attributed to his desire to conceal his part in Kriof's offence against
the girl.
In short, Justice Landau held, there had not been sufficient evi-
dence before the District Court to find the appellant guilty of unlaw-
ful sexual relations with a child under the age of 16. There had,
however, been sufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and
abetting Kriof to commit an indecent act upon the person of the
girl (it had not having been proved he had actually had sexual
intercourse with her) which is an offence against Sections 159 and 23
of the Criminal Code Ordinance. For this offence he should serve a
sentence of nine months' imprisonment and the previous sentence of
three years should be quashed.
Judgment given on February 28, 1957.
No COMPENSATION FOR CIVILAN WORKER POISONED
By FORBIDDEN ARmy FOOD
The Attorney General v. Rachel Berkowitz
Yitzhak Berkowitz was a civilian employed by the Army in a
military camp. In accordance with the regulations he was not allowed
to eat in the army canteens unless he had special permission to do
so and unless he had provided himself with food coupons for which
he paid either in cash or by way of deductions from his salary. He
nevertheless occasionally ate free of charge in the camp canteen with
the unauthorized permission of one of the sergeants in charge of the
kitchen. On one such occasion the food served was contaminated and
he, together with about a hundred soldiers, contracted ptomaine
poisoning, from which he died three days later.
His widow, the respondent, sued the Army for damages in the
Tel Aviv District Court. Judge Harpazi found that as the deceased
had obtained his food in defiance of the military authorities' pro-
hibition he was in the nature of a trespasser, and that prima facie
the Army, therefore, owed him no duty, in accordance with the
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principles of English common law. He went on, however, to make
a thorough and extensive survey of the law and found a solution
more to his own liking, holding that section 50 of the Civil Wrongs
Ordinance, which deals with negligence, does not distinguish between
trespassers and non-trespassers, that the fact that section 2 of the
ordinance refers us to English principles of legal interpretation does
not make the courts of Israel completely subject to the English
common law, and that in any case, in English law too, the rule with
regard to trespassers is not uniformly strict, recognizing occasions
when even trespassers are entitled to damages. Judge Harpazi went
on to enumerate such occasions, with particular emphasis on the in-
stance when a duty to take care exists vis-a-vis a crowd of people
whose presence in a place is foreseeable (as, for example, in a
restaurant or in a public vehicle). In such a case, he held, the fact
that one member of the crowd has failed to fulfil one of certain condi-
tions (such as paying for a meal or for a ticket) this failure, having
no connection whatsoever with his subsequent injury, would not
relieve the wrongdoer of liability towards him.
He therefore found that, in the present case, although the deceased
had been a trespasser, the Army nevertheless had a duty towards him
and were liable for his death, which had resulted from their negli-
gence.
The Attorney-General appealed against this decision to the Supreme
Court.
Section 50 (2). of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance provides that:
... every person owes a duty to all persons whom ... a reasonable
person ought in the circumstances to have contemplated as likely in
the usual course of things to be affected by the doing or failure to
do any act or the failure to use proper skill or to take proper
care....
Dr. Eltiss, Deputy State Attorney, appeared for the appellant and
Mr. V. Hassan for the respondent.
judgment
Justice Witkon, who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court,
the President and Justice Agranat concurring, dealt firstly with the
question of whether recourse should be had to English law or not.
It is true, he said, that section 50 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance does
not expressly refer to trespassers, but then neither does English
statutory law differentiate between the three grades of injured per-
sons, invitees, licensees and trespassers, this differentiation having its
roots in the common law, as propounded by the English courts. He
for his part, continued Justice Witkon, was also of the opinion that
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the courts of Israel were not indiscriminately bound by all the inter-
pretations and precedents which issued from the courts of England,
as such complete dependence would be inconsistent with the status of
Israel as an independent sovereign state (see C.A.81/55, P.D.
11/225). On the other hand, he continued, the reference to English
principles of law in section 2 of the Ordinance cannot be completely
ignored and the fact that the courts of Israel are not obliged to
adopt the principles of English common law holus bolus should not
be interpreted as meaning that some of the finest principles of the
English'common law should not be emulated (see also C.A.294/54,
P.D.12/421). Insofar as the distinction between various grades of
injured persons is concerned, he continued, the courts of Israel have
in fact accepted the English doctrine, as witness the judgment in
C.A.59/55 (Psakin 25/137) and C.A.224/51 (P.D.7/686), amongst
many others.
Justice Witkon then went on to discuss Judge Harpazi's opinion
that section 50(2) of the Ordinance imposes a duty to take care
towards all persons, even trespassers, whom a reasonable person
should have contemplated as likely to be affected. This interpretation,
l&e said, places too much emphasis on the criterion of "foreseeability,"
without paying sufficient attention to the fact that the law specifies
that the damage ought to have been foreseen by a reasonable person.
In other words, he continued, there are certain classes of people
whose likelihood of being affected might very well be foreseen, but,
nevertheless, no reasonable person would be expected to take this
eventuality into account; and of such are -trespassers whose presence
is unbeknown to the wrongdoer. In respect of such trespassers, the
wrongdoer has no moral-social duty to contemplate any possible
effects of his acts, constructive knowledge of their presence being
insufficient (in contradistinction to the case of invitees and licensees)
to make him liable for any harm they might suffer. Any other
approach to the question, he continued, would lead inevitably to
absolute responsibility and he very much doubted whether this was
either desirable or practicable, unless covered by national insurance.
Judge Harpazi, continued Justice Witkon, had not gone so far as
to hold all trespassers entitled to compensation. But the distinctions
he had drawn between one kind of trespasser and another could
not stand the test of logic, as he proceeded to show. In short, held
Justice Witkon, even when the injured trespasser is one of a crowd of
persons entitled to have been in the place where the injury occurred-
as in the case under consideration-his being a trespasser deprives him
of any right to compensation. Nor is this conclusion an unjust one,
he continued, for a trespasser would most certainly not be covered
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by any insurance which the wrongdoer might carry; and even if it
were possible to insure against a risk of this nature the high premium
would eventually be borne by those paying for the lawful use of
the wrongdoer's services and not by the trespasser-which was hardly
justifiable.
As to the argument that the deceased had not been a trespasser
as he had been permitted to eat in the canteen by the sergeant in
charge, the case under consideration, held Justice Witkon, must be
distinguished from C.A.119/54 (P.D.10/156) as here the deceased
had been well aware of the fact that the sergeants or officers in
charge of the Army canteen were forbidden to allow civilian em-
ployees to eat in them unless they fulfilled the conditions laid down
by the military authorities. As the deceased had not fulfilled these
conditions he was a trespasser, despite the permission he had received
from the sergeant.
In conclusion, Justice Witkon expressed regret at the fact that the
ex gratia payment, which the Ministry of Defence had expressed their
readiness to give the respondent in the event she lost the appeal, had
not been deferred to her originally, so sparing her the lengthy litigation
and the disappointment of losing her claim five years after -the tragedy
had occurred.
Appeal allowed without any costs.
Judgment given on February 5, 1960.
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